An Empirical Exploration of Exchange Rate Target-Zones by Robert P. Flood et al.
NBER WORKING PAPERS SERIES





Working Paper No. 3543




*Theauthors are, respectively: Senior Economist, Research
Department, IN4F; Assistant Professor, School of Business
Administration, University of California at Berkeley; and Chief of
Financial Studies, Research Department, IMF.Rose thanks the
International Finance Division of the Board of Governorsof the
Federal Reserve System and the Center forResearch and Management
at Berkeley for financial support. Thispaper is part of NBER's
research program in International Studies.Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the NationalBureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #3543
December 1990
AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION
OF EXCHANGE RATE TARGET-ZONES
AB8TRACT
In the context of a flexible-price monetary exchange rate
model and the assumption of uncovered interest parity,we obtain a
measure of the fundamental determinant of exchange rates. Daily
data for the European Monetary System are used toexplore the
importance of non—linearities in the relationship between the
exchange rates and fundamentals. Many implications of existing
"target-zone" exchange rate models are tested; littlesupport is
found for existing non-linear models of limitedexchange rate
flexibility.
Robert P. Flood Andrew K. Rose
Research Department School of Business
International Monetary Fund Administration




700 19th Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20431I: Introduction
In this paper, we attempt to characterize the behavior of nominal
exchange rates during fixed exchange rate regimes.  We are especially
interested in non-linearities which may exist in the relationship linking the
exchange rate to its fundamental determinants; that is, non-linearities in the
conditional mean of exchange rates.  These non-linearities are the focus of a
theoretical literature concerned with exchange rate "target zones".  We assess
the empirical importance of these non-linearities, focusing on the
participants in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary
System (EMS).
By implicitly using a flexible-price monetary exchange rate model and
the assumption of uncovered interest parity, we are able to obtain a daily
measure of the fundamental exchange rate determinant.  With this variable, we
search directly for a non-linear relationship between the exchange rate and
fundamentals.  We use three different modes of analysis: graphical study;
parametric testing for non-linear terms; and out-of-sample forecast analysis.
 We also test a number of implications of target zone models which do not rely
on our measure of fundamentals.  Our EMS findings are corroborated by data for
a number of bilateral exchange rates drawn from two different regimes of
limited exchange rate flexibility: the post-WWII Bretton Woods era, and the
pre-WWI gold standard. 
Our findings are largely negative.  We find mixed evidence of
statistically significant non-linearities in exchange rate conditional means.
 However, these non-linearities do not appear to be those implied by target
zone models; there is virtually no empirical support for many features of
existing target zone models.  We conclude that, in practice, models of fixed
exchange rates work just as poorly as do most models of flexible exchange
rates.
In the next section of the paper, the relevant theory and our empirical
strategy is outlined; section III provides a brief survey to the existing
literature, while a description of the data is contained in the following
section.  Section V provides a discussion of how we determine á, a parameter2
which is important in our model because it is required to identify exchange
rate fundamentals.  Our analysis of non-linearities in conditional means of
exchange rates is contained in the next four sections, which constitute the
core of the paper.  Section VI provides graphical analysis of the relationship
between the exchange rate and fundamentals.  Parametric tests for target-zone
non-linearities are reported in the following section; the forecast abilities
of linear and non-linear models are compared in section VIII.  A variety of
auxiliary implications of target zone models which do not rely on measurements
of fundamentals, are analyzed in section XIX.  A brief summary and some
concluding remarks are contained in section X.
II: Theory
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model of exchange rate
target zones.  We then use this model to derive distributional implications
for the exchange rate and fundamentals.  Finally we outline our approach to
measuring exchange rate fundamentals.
The Model
The model we use in our study is standard in the target zone literature
(e.g., Krugman (1990), and Froot and Obstfeld (1989a)).  In the model, the
natural logarithm of the spot exchange rate, et, (measured as the domestic
currency price of a unit of foreign exchange) is continuously equal to a
scalar measure of exchange rate fundamentals, ft, plus an opportunity cost
term proportional to the rate of change of the exchange rate expected at t,
Et(de/dt):
et = ft + áEt(de/dt). (1)
In the typical derivation of equation (1), ft is a linear function of
variables that enter money market equilibrium, while á is the interest rate
semi-elasticity of money demand; we follow that interpretation here.
1  The
expectation operator, Et is based on information through time t.  The latter3
includes values of the only forcing variable, ft, and the structure of the
model, including the nature of the equilibrium condition and any "process
switching" relevant to the forcing process.  By "process switching" we mean
changes in the process governing {f}; Flood and Garber (1983).  One type of
process switch, for example, might involve a policy switch from benign neglect
of exchange market fundamentals to specific interventions to alter the course
of f in order to protect an exchange rate zone. 
As is typical in rational expectations models, we conjecture that the
solution for the exchange rate is a function of the relevant state variable
with the additional condition that the function be a twice continuously
differentiable function of the state.  We consider only policies and forcing
processes where the current value of f summarizes the state:
et = g(ft) (2)
The precise form of the g function depends on the nature of contemplated
process switches.  Henceforth we will drop the notation for the time of
observation, t, writing for example, e = g(f). 
In the absence of any process switches, fundamentals follow:
dft = çdt + ódz (3)
where ç is the drift rate, ó is a positive constant and dz is a standard
Weiner process.  During process switches, the f process changes to another
process dictated by the particular policy switch.
Using our trial solution from (2) and invoking Ito's lemma:
Etde/dt = çg'(f) + (ó2/2)g''(f) (4)
Substituting from equation (4) into equation (1), we obtain:
g(f) = f + áçg'(f) + (áó2/2)g''(f) (5)4
Equation (5) is a second order differential equation, which has the general
solution:
2
g(f) = f + áç + A1exp(ë1f) + A2exp(ë2f) (6)
where ë1 > 0 and ë2 < 0 are the roots of:
ë2áó2/2 + ëáç - 1 = 0. (7)
The integration constants A1 and A2 are determined by process switching
side conditions.  Different side conditions result in different settings for
the constants.  Indeed during periods of policy volatility, agents' settings
for the A's should shift with policy perceptions. 
Three patterns for the setting of the constants have emerged in the
literature.  First, if agents pay no attention to the policy side conditions
then (ruling out bubbles) A1=A2=0.
3  Second, if the target zone is credible,
agents must anticipate that the authorities will stop the drift of
fundamentals out of the zone when fundamentals and the exchange rate reach the
boundaries of the target zone.  Consequently, credible target zones give rise
to "sure thing" bets about fundamentals at the boundaries.  In order to keep
such bets about fundamentals from translating into profit opportunities,
agents require "smooth pasting" conditions at the boundaries.  These smooth
pasting conditions ensure that the exchange rate will not change in response
to anticipated infinitesimal intervention at the boundaries.  Smooth pasting
requires A1<0 and A2>0.
4  This result is true for all credible zones, with or
without intra-marginal interventions.  The third possibility is that the
target zone does not have full credibility.  In this case, the constants are
unconstrained until alternative policies are specified; see e.g., Bertola and
Caballero (1989b).  Refer to currently non-existent figure 1.
Properties of Unconditional Distributions5
In a credible target zone, both the distribution of increments to f and
the function which transforms f into values of exchange rates and interest
rate differentials, are known.  Hence, a number of properties of the
conditional and unconditional joint distribution of the exchange rate (e) and
the interest rate differential (i-i*) in the zone can be deduced.  These
properties were derived by Svensson (1990c); aside from a few comments to aid
the reader's intuition, we leave the technical details of the derivation of
these properties to the Svensson paper.
5
If the f increments are normally distributed, and f and e are bounded by
a target zone, one can determine the nature of the distribution of the
endogenous target zone variables.  Since f drives the model, the distribution
for f also drives the distributions for e and (i-i*).  Harrison (1985, p.90)
shows that if the drift rate of fundamentals, ç, is zero, the unconditional
distribution of f in the target zone is uniform between the upper and lower f
boundaries.  If ç￿0, f is distributed truncated exponential.
Recall that the exchange rate in a credible target zone follows the S-
shape of Figure 1.  Consequently the unconditional distribution of the
exchange rate will be bi-modal with the modes at the e boundaries. 
Intuitively, this bi-modality follows from the "flattening" of the S-shape
near the zone edges.  Because the S-curve is flat, a large range of possible
outcomes for f become concentrated in a small number of outcomes for e.
A variant of the logic that predicts a bi-modal distribution for the
exchange rate also predicts a uni-modal distribution for the interest rate
differential.  Assuming uncovered interest parity (about which more later),
the interest rate differential, from equation (1) is (de/dt) = (i-i*) / ä(f) =
(e(f)-f)/á.  Plotted against f, this is a negatively sloping relationship [as
ä'(f) = ((e'(f)-1)/á), and (0#e'(f)<1)], with its steepest slopes at the zone
boundaries, since e'(f)=0 at the boundaries.  It follows that a given number
of f outcomes at the boundaries become stretched over a large range of e
outcomes so that little probability is attached to big ä outcomes at the lower6
zone boundary and little probability is attached to low ä outcomes at the
zone's upper bound.
Conditional Distributions
Conditional distributions correspond to the distributions used for "one-
step-ahead" forecasting.  Once again, the joint distribution of e and ä will
be driven by the distribution of f; now, however, it is the increments to f
that are relevant.  Increments to fundamentals are assumed to be normal almost
everywhere by assumption.  Since e=e(f), de=e'(f)df and óe(f)=e'(f)ó, where
óe(f) is the instantaneous standard deviation of e.  Since e'(f) vanishes at
the target zone boundaries it follows that óe(f) also vanishes at the
boundaries.  Indeed, the conditional standard deviation of e will be
increasing in f for low values of f and falling in f for high values of f. 
The relationship between óe(f) and f may be quite flat for central values in
the f range because e'(f) may be insensitive to f over this range.
The target zone offers a trade-off between exchange rate volatility and
interest rate differential volatility. Svensson shows that:
óe(f) + áó
ä(f) = ó (8)
That is, in a credible target zone, conditional exchange rate volatility is




The model presented in equation (1) bears only a limited direct relation
to observables.  While the exchange rate is observable almost continuously,
the model gives us little guidance on how to observe the triplet
{ft,á,Etde/dt}.
7  We note, however, that if we could observe any two members of
the triplet then by using equation (1), we would have the third member.  Our
empirical strategy entails obtaining measures of á and Etde/dt and deducing a
measure for exchange rate fundamentals, ft.  This approach obviously precludes
tests of equation (1), since the latter is used to construct measured
fundamentals.  However, our strategy does allow us to construct and compare
reduced form equations which are based on equation (1).
It is relatively easy to observe Etde/dt; we defer discussion of á to
section V.  Assuming covered interest parity for contracts of length h:
1 + it,h = (1 + i*t,h)Ft,h /ERt (9)
where it,h is the interest rate at time t on domestic funds borrowed for a
period of length h, i
*
t,h is the corresponding foreign interest rate, Ft,h is
the forward exchange rate quoted at time t for delivery at t+h and ERt is the
level of the spot exchange rate at time t. The relationship between the
forward rate and the expected future spot rate is given by:
Ft,h = EtERt,h + RPt,h (10)
where RPt,h is the risk premium at time t for contracts of length h.  If agents
in the foreign exchange market maximize the expectation of an intertemporally
separable utility function then:
RPt,h = [Covt(U'(Ct+h)/Pt+h,ERt+h)]/[Et(U'(Ct+h)/Pt+h] (11)
where: Covt(.,.) denotes the covariance operator conditional on information at
time t; U'(Ct+h) is the marginal utility of consumption at time t+h; and Pt+h is8
the price level at time t+h.
8 
We intend to ignore risk premia in this study for two reasons.  First,
Svensson (1990a) has shown that for constant relative risk aversion utility
functions, the risk premium in a credible target zone is small.  Second, in
the empirical part of this study we rely on daily observations of two day
interest rates.  Regardless of the form of utility function, the risk premium
imbedded in such short contracts is likely to be negligible, compared with the
expected rate of change of the exchange rate.
9,10
Once risk premia have been assumed away, combine equations (9) and (10)
to yield:
EtERt+h/ERt = (1+it,h)/(1+i*t,h) (12)
Taking natural logarithms of each side of this equation, and applying two
approximations we arrive at:
11
Etet+h - et = it,h - i*t,h (13)
We observe interest rates on contracts with a two day maturity; by
equation (12), that is equivalent to observing the two day expected rate of
change of the exchange rate.  We treat the two day expected rate of change of
the exchange rate as the instantaneous expected rate of change of the exchange
rate.9
III: Previous Findings
Most previous empirical examinations of non-linearities in exchange rate
behavior have focused on non-linearities which affect even moments of the
exchange rate process, often the conditional variance of the exchange rate. 
For instance, it is known that exchange rates manifest substantial
leptokurtosis; conditional forecast variances of exchange rates also exhibit
serial dependence (Meese and Rose (1990a) provide references).  However,
relatively little empirical work has been done to link the level of the
exchange rate to fundamentals in an intrinsically non-linear fashion.  Until
recently, there appeared to be no theoretical reason to pursue such avenues. 
The Krugman (1990) paper was one of the first articles to presently an
economically interesting model of the exchange rate which was explicitly non-
linear. 
There is another, more important, explanation for the dearth of non-
linear empirical work on conditional means of exchange rates.  Empirical work
on exchange rate determination has been dampened by the negative results of
Meese and Rogoff (1983).  Meese and Rogoff demonstrated that a forecaster
equipped with a variety of linear structural exchange rate models and actual
ex-post knowledge of the determinants of such models, would be unable to
forecast more accurately than a naive random walk model.  It should be noted
that target zone models require a structural linear model (that is, a set of
fundamentals to which additional non-linear terms are tacked on in the
presence of a target zone; see equation (6)), so that target zone models have,
at the very least, all the problems of floating exchange rate models.
Only a small amount of relevant empirical research has been conducted to
date.  Almost without exception, economists have taken heed of the negative
results of Meese and Rogoff, and abstained from positing explicit parametric
models of fundamentals (in contrast, much of the work presented below is
parametric).  Meese and Rose (1990b) use non-parametric techniques and find
little evidence that non-linear models fit exchange rate data better than10
linear models during fixed exchange rate periods.  Diebold and Nason (1990)
and Meese and Rose (1990a) find comparable results both in-sample and out-of-
sample during floating exchange rate regimes using univariate and multivariate
data respectively.  Smith and Spencer (1990) use the method of simulated
moments to avoid positing a model of fundamentals in modeling the German-
Italian exchange rate during the EMS; Smith and Smith (1990) do not engage in
any estimation at all.  Bertola and Caballero (1990b) present informal
evidence on three aspects of two EMS exchange rates from the early- through
mid-1980s.  Svensson (1990b, 1990d) uses a variety of techniques with Swedish
data to test and corroborate a model of target zones with realignment risks
without relying on a model of fundamentals.  Pessach and Razin (1990) is the
paper which is closest to ours in spirit; they use Israeli data in a
parametric fashion and find some evidence of symmetric non-linear effects
implied by target zone models in the rate of change of the exchange rate. 
IV: Description of the Data
The major focus of this paper is the EMS regime of fixed but adjustable
exchange rates.  We concentrate on the EMS both for its intrinsic and current
interest, and for easy comparison with the literature.  Relevant features of
the institutional structure of the EMS are described in an appendix.
Our EMS data were obtained from the BIS.  We also use BIS data for non-
EMS countries, and for EMS countries during the period preceding the ERM.
12 
The data are daily; exchange rates are recorded at the daily "official fixing"
while interest rates are annualized bid rates at around 10am Swiss time.
13,14,15
 We focus on 2-day interest rates (which will be taken to be "the interest
rate", unless explicitly noted otherwise); we use 1-month and 12-month rates
to check on our results.  Two-day interest rates have been used because they
are the shortest available interest rates (they also reflect the yield on a
deposit that has the same maturity as the two-day settlement period in foreign
exchange markets).
16,17  The interest rates are Euro-market rates, and should11
be relatively free of political, credit, settlement and liquidity risk premia,
at least for interest rate differentials across different currencies at the
same maturity.
18  Two-day interest rates are unavailable for Denmark and
Ireland until February 1982 and November 1981 respectively.  The data have
been extensively checked for errors in a number of ways.
19 
Unless otherwise noted, we always use natural logarithms of exchange
rates; for interest rates, we almost always use the natural logarithm of one
plus the interest rate (in percentage points) divided by 100.
20  In our EMS
work, Germany is treated as the "home" country, so that exchange rates are
always the DM price of one unit of foreign exchange, and interest rate
differentials are always German interest rates minus foreign interest rates.
For the purposes of comparison, we also use data for the period of fixed
exchange rates that prevailed during the classical Gold Standard.  Our
exchange rate data are taken from Andrew (1910), who tabulates data on weekly
nominal exchange rates of the US vis-à-vis the UK, France and Germany for the
National Monetary Commission.  The rate are the average of weekly highs and
lows.  Kemmerer (1910) provides weekly data on American interest rates, also
gathered for the National Monetary Commission.  The rate is a weekly average
call loan rate for the NYSE.  The National Monetary Commission (1910)
tabulates British call money rates and French "market rates of discount".  Our
German interest rate data were gathered from back issues of The Economist. 
The gold standard data span 1899-1908.
We also use monthly data from the Bretton Woods regime of adjustable
pegged exchange rates.  This data was obtained from the OECD's Main Economic
Indicators.  The exchange rates are point-in-time spot rates, while the
interest rates are usually quoted for three month domestic treasury-bills. 
The data are drawn from the longest single period of exchange rate tranquility
during the 1960s (e.g., the German data begin after the March 1961 revaluation
and end before the October 1969 revaluation).  For both the gold standard and
Bretton Woods data, the USA is treated as the home country.12
Figures 2 through 7 contain plots of the basic daily EMS data.
21  Each
figure contains three time-series plots, and one scatter-plot.  The top left
graph is a time-series plot of the nominal exchange rate (measured, as always,
as the natural logarithm of the DM price of one unit of foreign exchange); the
upper and lower (implied) EMS exchange rate bands are also included in the
graph.  Tick marks along the top of the diagram delineate calendar years; the
ticks along the bottom denote realignments which affected either of the
relevant two currencies (e.g., either the DM, the Belgian Franc or both, in
the case of the DM/Bfr rate).  The top right graph is a time-series plot of
the 2-day interest rate differential (as always, the German rate minus the
foreign rate).  The bottom left graph plots the fundamental exchange rate
determinant (using á=.1).  Finally, the bottom right graph is a scatter-plot
of the exchange rate against the fundamental over the entire sample range.  As
is true of most of our graphics, scales are not directly comparable across
countries; the Dutch exchange rate has actually been much more stable than the
Italian exchange rate even though the relevant exchange rate bands appear
wider on the graphs.
The EMS has experienced a number of (increasingly infrequent)
realignments.  Our use of fine frequency data enables us to split our data
into thirteen different parts, corresponding to the periods between the twelve
different realignments of the EMS.  We divide our data for a number of
reasons.  A split sample allows us to check the sensitivity of our results. 
Dividing the sample also allows us to check for policy shifts such as the
often noted increasing credibility of the EMS (which should be manifest in
changing types of non-linearities), and time-varying capital controls.
22 
Bertola and Caballero (1990a) also argue that the nature of the non-linear
relationship is expected to vary over time with the level of reserves.  The
thirteen different samples are tabulated below; it should be noted that the
number of potential observations varies dramatically across regimes.  In
virtually all of regime-specific work below, data for the business weeks13
immediately before and after realignments are excluded.
EMS Regimes used in Empirical Analysis
     Potential Number of
EMS Regime     Dates   Observations
Regime 1: 1979:3:30-1979:9:16 134
Regime 2: 1979:9:29-1979:11:25 39
Regime 3: 1979:12:14-1981:3:15 331
Regime 4: 1981:4:4-1981:9:27 130
Regime 5: 1981:10:17-1982:2:14 117
Regime 6: 1982:3:6-1982:6:6 70
Regime 7: 1982:6:26-1983:3:13 190
Regime 8: 1983:4:2-1985:7:14 600
Regime 9: 1985:8:3-1986:3:30 175
Regime 10: 1986:4:19-1986:7:27 75
Regime 11: 1986:8:16-1987:1:4 105
Regime 12: 1987:1:24-1989:12:31 770
Regime 13: 1990:1:20-1990:5:16 87
As is well-known, the EMS has become increasingly credible in the sense
that the periods between realignments seem to be growing longer.  In our
empirical work, we intend to test for other manifestations of increasing
credibility.
Volatility in Exchange and Interest Rates
Descriptive statistics are contained in table A1 of the appendix, which
tabulates sample standard deviations for three variables: the (log of the)
exchange rate; the 2-day interest differential; and the fundamental (using
á=.1).  The statistics are computed separately for all thirteen EMS regimes;
realignment days are recorded at the extreme left of the table. 
A number of points emerge from the descriptive statistics of table A1. 
First, we note that exchange rate volatility varies dramatically over time for
each country.  While more recent regimes are not generally associated with
high volatility (measured by historical standards), neither are they
associated with exceptionally low volatility.  On the other hand, interest
rate differentials do seem to be less volatile more recently. 
Second, there are large differences across countries in both exchange
rate and interest rate volatility.  For instance, the Netherlands has much
lower exchange rate volatility than the other EMS countries. 14
Third, no tradeoff between exchange rate and interest differential
volatility is apparent in the data.  Figure 8 is a series of bar-charts of
exchange rates and interest rate differentials standard deviations for each of
the six EMS countries over the thirteen different regimes.  No relationship is
apparent between the two measures.
23  The absence of any tradeoff between
exchange rate and interest rate volatility also characterizes conditional
measures.  Figure 9 provides stacked bar chart graphs of standard deviations
of residuals from bivariate fifth-order VAR of interest rate differentials and
exchange rates.
24  These non-findings are more readily apparent in figure A1
which pools together the data from all the EMS countries and regimes.  This
negative result is the first of many to come. 
Unit-root tests (allowing for serial dependence through the method
suggested by Perron (1988)) are tabulated in Table A2.  The results indicate,
unsurprisingly, that unit-roots are pervasive throughout the data.  More
precisely, the null hypothesis that a unit-root exists cannot usually be
rejected at conventional significance levels in each of: the exchange rate;
fundamentals (using á=.1); and the interest differential.  While this may be
the result of low power (Froot and Obstfeld (1990b)), it is extremely
disturbing that the interest differential appears to be non-stationary. 
Ignoring constant drift, the difference between the exchange rate and
fundamentals is the expected rate change of the exchange rate; uncovered
interest parity implies that the latter is the same as the interest
differential.  A non-stationary interest differential is inconsistent with
credible target zones; the persistence in this series which cannot be
accounted for by fundamentals will return to haunt our hypothesis tests later.
The hypothesis that fundamentals have a unit-root cannot typically be
rejected at conventional significance levels, consistent with the theoretical
assumption made in section II.  In fact, the assumption that fundamentals
follow a driftless random walk, while not literally true, seems to be a good
approximation.
2515
V: Determination of Alpha
 Our strategy will be to find an appropriate range for á; we then
conduct our analysis for reasonable values of á which span this range.  We
estimate á by two methods.  First, we use our data to estimate á.  Second, we
use estimates from the literature. 
Estimating á from Daily Data
If the increments to f are generated by equation (3) then
integrating df over one day results in:
ft - ft-1 = ç + zt (3') 
      
where the discrete-time period is one day, ç is the daily growth rate of
fundamentals and zt, which is the integral over one day of ódz, is the daily
disturbance to the f process. Now substitute from equation (3') into equation
(1) yielding:
et = et-1 = ç + á[Et(de/dt)-Et-1(de/dt)] + zt (14)
For estimation we replace Et-j(de/dt) with (it-j-i*t-j) where all interest rates
are two day rates.  Equation (14) then becomes an estimating equation for ç
and á.
Our estimates of alpha are tabulated in table 1; they are also presented
in figure 10.  This figure graphs the point estimate of alpha, along with a
two standard error band.
26  The estimates are almost uniformly small, although
they vary considerably across country and EMS regime.  With the exception of a
few imprecise estimates for Denmark and France, there is little statistical
evidence that alpha exceeds .25.  Indeed, there are a number of negative
estimates of alpha; the hypothesis that alpha is zero does not seem
unreasonable from a purely statistical point of view.
27
Estimates of á in the Literature16
We have interpreted á as the negative of the interest rate semi-
elasticity of money demand, a parameter which plays a widespread role in both
theoretical and empirical macroeconomics.  This parameter has been estimated
previously in the literature; Goldfeld and Sichel (1990) provide a survey. 
The short-run semi-elasticities reported are all quite similar to each other
and average -.4 
28,29  These estimates are converted to long-run elasticities
by dividing by the average quarterly speed of adjustment, .32 per quarter,
giving a long run semi-elasticity estimate of -1.25, which we take to be
representative of semi-elasticity estimates for industrial countries during
normal times.
There are two ways to apply these estimates to daily data.  First, in
the spirit of the models upon which equation (1) is based, one can think of a
model of continuous long-run money market equilibrium so that an appropriate
choice of á is 1.25.  More realistically, one can think of equation (1) as
resulting from a Goldfeld-style partial adjustment model of the money market.
 In this view, it is the short-run interest rate semi-elasticity that is
relevant to the problem; that is obtained by dividing -.4 by 90 days per
quarter, giving a daily short-run semi-elasticity of -.0044, so that á=.0044
seems appropriate
Our various methods of uncovering á have led us to a range for this
parameter.  We think of á=.1 as being a reasonable value; á=1 is certainly
representative of the high end of the range.  In most of our work below we
report results based on á=.1 and á=1.  A number of different manifestations of
the data indicate that á=.1 is a good choice for this key parameter.
Given an á value, the fundamentals can be measured at the monthly
frequency and compared with the traditional reduced-form determinants of
flexible-price exchange rate models, money and output.
30  We obtained monthly
IFS measures of M1 and industrial production,
31 computed natural logarithms of
differentials between German and foreign variables, and regressed our measure
of fundamentals on actual money-supply and output differentials.  The17
regressions are computed from 1979 through 1990 on a country-by-country basis.
 Our measures of fundamentals are typically highly correlated in levels with
actual money and output differentials; for instance, the R
2s for our six
countries have an average of .63.  On the other hand, the coefficients on
actual fundamentals are not signed consistently, and there is substantial
residual autocorrelation.  In first-differences, our fundamental measures are
essentially uncorrelated with money and output.
VI: Graphical Analysis of Non-Linearities
A Direct Examination of the Exchange Rate: Fundamentals Relationship
In this section of the paper, we analyze the relationship between
exchange rates and fundamentals using graphical techniques.  Our conclusions
will be corroborated below with more rigorous econometric techniques.  We
begin with the assumption á=.1.
Figures 11 through 16 contain a wealth of descriptive graphical
information about the relationship between the exchange rate (e) and
fundamentals (f).  Each figure (except that for Ireland) contains fourteen
"small multiple" e:f scatter-plots; one for each of the thirteen EMS regimes,
and another covering the whole sample from 1979 through 1990.  The use of
small multiple graphs allows the data to be compared easily across regimes and
countries.
In any given scatter-plot, each of the individual points represents a
single daily observation.  To guide the eye in connecting the dots, a non-
parametric "data smoother" is drawn as a solid line.
32  We use the shapes of
these smoothers extensively in our search for non-linear relationships between
e and f.  The smoother can easily handle the non-linear patterns implied by
the target zone theories above; conversely, absence of sensible non-linear
smoother patterns suggests (though does not prove) that the theories work
poorly. 
The (implied) EMS exchange rate bands are drawn as horizontal lines in18
the figures; maxima and minima are labelled on each axis.  The marginal
density for e is displayed to the right of the scatter-plot; each observation
is represented with a single tick mark.  Immediately to the right of the
marginal density, a box-and-whiskers plot of the marginal density is also
displayed.  The line in the middle of the box marks the median of the marginal
distribution; the box covers the interquartile range (i.e., from the 25th
percentile range to the 75th percentile range).  The whiskers extend to upper-
and lower-"adjacent values"; points beyond adjacent values are usually
considered outliers.
33  A comparable marginal density and box plot for f is
graphed above the diagram.  This combination of graphs allows one to evaluate
the marginal and joint distributions simultaneously.
Target zone theories places a number of restrictions on the marginal
distributions of e and f, as discussed above.  For instance, the simple model
of Krugman (1990) implies that (with perfect credibility and infitessimal
interventions on the bands) the exchange rate is expected asymptotically to
have a bimodal symmetric density which would be directly apparent in the
marginal distribution, and manifest in the box plot as a relatively wide
symmetric interquartile range with small whiskers.  The model of Bertola and
Caballero (1990b) delivers a very different set of restrictions.  In addition,
some theories (e.g., Bertola and Caballero (1990a)) present restrictions on
the relationship between e and f across regimes; hence the scatters for the
entire sample.
Consider the top left graph in figure 11 which describes the
relationship between e and f for Belgium during the first EMS regime, which
prevailed from March 13, 1979 through September 23, 1979.  The data are
grouped in the lower portion of the graph, indicating that the Belgian Franc
was relatively weak during this period; the box plot for e indicates that the
median value of the exchange rate is quite low in the band, and there are no
positive outliers.  This is true despite the fact that fundamentals are
approximately symmetrically distributed in an apparently normal distribution.19
 The relationship between e and f appears to be monotonic, positive and
slightly non-linear in a manner reminiscent of Krugman's S-shape, though it is
very close to the lower boundary.
No simple general characterization can be made about the e:f
relationship.  However a number of features do seem apparent.  First, and most
importantly, remarkably few non-linearities are apparent.  Second, currencies
which are typically viewed as being more committed to the EMS have fewer (not
more) manifestations of non-linearities.  For instance, non-linearities are
not readily apparent in the Dutch data compared with the other five countries,
although the Netherlands is generally considered to be a country which
maintains a credible exchange rate band (Holland has only experienced two
realignments vis-a-vis Germany).  On the other hand, the Dutch exchange rate
is usually in the middle of the band.  Assuming that the actual exchange rate
bands coincide with the declared bands, non-linearities are difficult to
detect if the exchange rate stay in the middle of the zone.
34
Third, non-linearities appear to be growing less important over time,
rather than more important.  However, increased credibility should be manifest
in an relationship between the exchange rate and fundamentals which
increasingly comes to resemble Krugman's S-shape, as realignments become more
unlikely.
35
Fourth, while some non-linearities are apparent, they tend not to have
shapes which are even vaguely similar to those implied by extant theories. 
Countries which experience frequent realignments (such as Italy) do not appear
to have inverted S-shapes, as implied by the Bertola and Caballero (1990b)
model; credible countries (such as the Netherlands) do not have Krugman's S-
shape.  That is, the non-linearities which are apparent do not seem to have
sensible identifiable patterns across either time or country.
Fifth, much of the data is clustered in the middle of the declared
exchange rate bands, especially for later regimes.  This may indicate that the
authorities defended implicit bands well within the declared bands; in this20
case our theoretical analysis carries through for the actual implicit bands,
so long as the market recognized this fact.
36  The fact that exchange rates
spend much of their time in the interior of the band may instead be a small
sample problem.  Given the sample sizes involved and the nature of the forcing
process under the null hypothesis, we are skeptical of this view; however,
non-linearities would be much more difficult to detect if exchange rates
happen to have avoided the periphery of the bands.
37
Finally, the e:f relationship appears to be approximately linear over
the entire sample, consistent with the model of Bertola and Caballero (1990a).
Figures 11 through 16 rely on our assumption á=.1.  Clearly as á falls,
the scatter-plots in these figures move closer towards an exact affine
relationship between e and f; if á=0, e=f exactly.  Figures A2 through A7 in
the appendix are the analogues to figures 11 through 16, but computed with
á=1, a value which is implausibly large in our view.  These figures indicate
non-linear effects of substantively greater importance, although it is again
difficult to detect patterns over time or country.  Again, the smoother shapes
bear little resemblance to those implied by extant exchange rate models.
38
Comparison with Other Exchange Rate Regimes
While the scatter-plots of figures 11 through 16 do not seem consistent
with the implications of known non-linear exchange rate theories, we hasten to
add that countries which participate in the EMS do not look similar to
countries in (relatively) free floats.  Figures 17 through 20 are graphs
(comparable in every way to Figures 11-16) for four exchange rates which are
floating (relatively) freely against the DM: the Japanese yen; the Swiss
Franc; the British pound; and the American dollar (all rates are again
bilateral DM rates).
39  Again, each figure has fourteen small graphs, one for
each of the thirteen regimes, as well as one for the whole sample.  While
actions such as the Plaza Accord and the Louvre Agreement clearly lead one to
doubt the assumption of perfectly free floating, the e:f scatters look much
more linear for non-EMS countries than they do for EMS countries.21
Another natural comparison can be made between the EMS countries during
the EMS 1980s and the pre-EMS 1970s.  Figure 21 contains e:f scatters for five
of the six EMS currencies (Irish data are unavailable) during the period from
1977:9:1 through 1979:3:12 which preceded the EMS.  During this period,
Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands participated in the European common
margins arrangement, commonly known as the "Snake", the precursor to the EMS.
 The graphs appear to be conspicuously linear.
Finally, the EMS can be compared with other regimes of fixed exchange
rates.  Figure 22 provides graphs for the post-WWII Bretton Woods regime of
pegged but adjustable rates; figure 23 provides comparable data for the pre-
WWI classical gold standard.  Both figures use á=.1.
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The relationship between the exchange rate and fundamentals seems to be
decidedly more non-linear for the gold standard than for the EMS; the
dollar/yen rate also appears to be non-linearly related to fundamentals during
the Bretton Woods era.
41  However, most of the Bretton Woods data appear
consistent with linear e:f relationships, while the smoothers in the gold
standard data are not implied by existing target zone models.
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Is There a "Honeymoon" Effect?
As discussed above, the thrust of the original target zone proposal was
to make the exchange rate less responsive to fluctuations in exchange rate
fundamentals, the celebrated "honeymoon effect" of Krugman (1990).  Actual
estimates of the slopes for all countries and EMS regimes are presented in
table 3; we simply regress et on ft (and an intercept).  We also provide the
data in a graphical format in figure 24, which we find to be more accessible.
Consistent with the honeymoon effect (and inconsistent with the work of
Bertola and Caballero (1990b)), for á=.1, the e:f slope is often less than
unity, though rarely by a large margin.  However, for any given country, our
point estimates of the slope vary considerably over time, being greater than
unity for around a third of the regimes considered; point estimates of small
slopes also tend to be imprecise.  Further, there are few identifiable22
patterns in the slope estimates.  For instance, the unstable regimes of the
early 1980s are associated with small slopes, while the credible regimes of
the late 1980s seem to have higher slopes.  Also, slope estimates for
countries as different as Italy and the Netherlands do not appear to be very
different.  Finally, it will be shown below that the non-linear effects which
give rise to the honeymoon effect in target zone models such as Krugman
(1990), are not usually found in the data.
Simple algebra can show that a choice of á which is too high will lead
to an e:f slope which is too low.  Given our uncertainty about á, we conduct
some sensitivity analysis.  Figures 25 and 26 are comparable to figure 24, but
use á=.05 and 1. respectively.  For á=.05, there is essentially no evidence of
that the e:f slope strongly differs from unity.  Thus a slightly smaller value
of á (one that we do not view as unreasonable) eliminates any evidence of the
honeymoon effect.  For á=1., all point estimates (across six exchange rates
and thirteen EMS regimes) are less than unity, virtually always by
statistically significant margins.  Indeed, the e:f slopes are clustered
closer to zero than to unity.  We view this as another manifestation of our
hypothesis that unity is an excessively high choice for á.23
Summary
Some non-linearities are apparent in the scatter-plots between the
exchange rate and fundamentals; the e:f relationship tends to look much more
linear for floating exchange rates than it does for fixed exchange rates. 
However, in a number of different dimensions, the non-linearities do not seem
to conform to the patterns implied by target zone models.  The few non-
linearities which do exist do not appear as one might expect in more credible
exchange rates (such as the Dutch Guilder), more recently (e.g., since 1987),
or in the S-shapes implied by existing theories.  Similarly, although there is
modest evidence of a "honeymoon effect", the size of this effect does not vary
in a sensible way across regimes; in any case, the existence of the effect
depends strongly on á, and reasonable values of á are consistent with no
honeymoon effect.
Our relatively naive graphical approach has yielded at best extremely
weak support for target-zone non-linearities.  We now attempt to clarify the
issue by applying more econometric firepower.
VII: Parametric Tests for Non-Linear Effects
In this section, we estimate target zone models directly, and test the
significance of non-linear terms.  We find that the non-linear terms often add
significant explanatory power in sample.  However, the finding of
statistically significant non-linearities in-sample is too robust; it occurs
for both fixed and floating exchange rates.  Also, coefficient signs are not
those predicted by target zone models, and a number of different aspects of
the model are rejected.
The structural model we wish to estimate is:
ft = ç + ft-1 + zt (12)
et = áç + ft + A1exp(ë1ft) + A2exp(ë2ft) (15)24
In our actual empirical, we work with a slight variant of (15):
et - á - ft = È0 + È1exp(1ft) + È2exp(2ft) + È3ft + wt (16)
where:  is the estimate of ç from equation (12) (adjusted to an annual rate);
1 and 2 are the roots to equation (7) with estimates of ó and ç used in place
of true ó and ç; and  is the estimated standard of the residual of equation
(12) (adjusted to annual rates).  We maintain á=.1 for most of the analysis
which follow.
We allow for two potential mis-specifications of the model by including
È0 and È3; a finding of either È0= /0 or È3= /0 is an indication of model mis-
specification (multicollinearity considerations often preclude free estimation
of È0).  An error term has also been added to the equation; Froot and Obstfeld
(1989b) suggest that this can be interpreted in a domestic context as the
result of time-varying income tax rates which are conditionally independent of
ft.  Measurement errors?  Fads?  Time-series properties?  We also examine the
serial correlation properties of this disturbance below.
Since there are cross-equation restrictions, estimation of these
equations should be conducted jointly; for convenience, we pursue two-step
estimation below.
43  Rose's artificial instumental variables.  Thus, we
estimate (12) with OLS; consistent estimates of ç and ó are obtained from the
intercept and standard error of the residual respectively.  These estimates
are then used to estimate ë1 and ë2; (16) can then be estimated directly with
OLS.  A1 and A2 can be consistently estimated with 1 and 2; from the latter, e
L
and e
U can be estimated.  In practice, we test the hypothesis È1=È2=0
(<=A1=A2=0), rather than hypotheses likee ^ L=eL ande ^ U=eU.
Two problems affect this work in practice.  First, small values of ó
give rise to large values of ë, which can lead to computational complexities.
 Such problems can be avoided by appropriate rescaling of the data.  More
importantly, there is often severe multicollinearity between the regressors of
(16). For this reason, tests of the joint hypothesis È1=È2=0 are tabulated in25
table 4.  Table 4 also presents the estimated signs of the È coefficients.  As
shown in the theoretical section, the A1 and A2 are of opposite sign in
virtually all existing theoretical target zone models.
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Table 4 also presents two specification tests (the restriction È0=0 was
imposed for the analysis reported in table 4).  First, the marginal
significance level from a standard Q-test to examine the serial correlation
properties of the residual from (16) is tabulated; a high number indicates
statistically significant autocorrelation.  Second, the marginal significance
level of a t-test of the hypothesis È3=0 is also presented.  Rejection of this
hypothesis is also another indication of model failure.
The results of Table 4 indicate that the joint hypothesis È1=È2=0 is
usually rejected at conventional significance levels.  This result is quite
strong; rejections occur for most countries and most EMS regimes.  The
existence of non-linearities of the type implied by target zone models seems,
at first blush, to be overwhelmingly supported.  We have also examined a
number of perturbations of the basic regression framework.  The analogue to
the first part of table 4 for á=1 is included as table A3 in the appendix; the
results of a first-differenced version of the test are in table A4.  Neither
perturbation changes the basic results of table 4.  The rejection of È1=È2=0
is also insensitive to: use of á=.05; choice of 2-day (as opposed to 30-day
interest rates); the exact sample period (we tried excluding both a) only the
day and b) the whole month before and after realignments); and day-of-the-week
effects (we estimated (16) for both Fridays and non-Fridays separately).  This
rejection also characterizes all the currencies in both the Bretton Woods and
gold standard regimes of fixed rates.  The hypothesis È1=È2=0 is usually
strongly rejected; we conclude that the finding of statistically significant
in-sample non-linearities in the conditional means of exchange rates is quite
robust.
However the economic meaning of this conclusion is not so clear.  The
signs of È1 and È1 are also tabulated in table 4.  As demonstrated in the26
theoretical section, these are expected to be of opposite sign in most target
zone models (both credible and incredible).  However, with the exception of
early Dutch regimes, the signs of È1 and È2 are almost always identical.
45  The
statistical model also does not easily withstand further scrutiny.  There is
strong evidence of severe residual autocorrelation (because of this
autocorrelation, Newey-West covariance estimators have been used for the
hypothesis tests).  In only a few cases can one reject the null hypothesis of
no autocorrelation.  Further, the model seems to be mis-specified in that È3
is often significantly differ from zero.  Again, these results are relatively
robust.
Interestingly enough, the results of table 4 are too robust; the
hypothesis È1=È2=0 is usually rejected for floating exchange rates as well as
fixed exchange rates.  (16) was estimated for the thirteen different EMS
regimes for the American dollar, the British pound, the Japanese yen, and the
Swiss franc.  Of the resulting 52 test statistics (13 EMS regimes x 4
currencies), all but seven were statistically significant at the 5% confidence
level (most were significant at the .01% confidence level).  Similarly, during
the pre-EMS period, the hypothesis È1=È2=0 is rejected at the 5% significance
level for three of the five currencies for which we have data.
Flood's Monte Carlo work 27
Summary
Parametric tests for non-linearities leaves us with a mixed verdict.  On
the one hand, non-linearities of the type implied by target-zone models seem
to be statistically significant in-sample.  The hypothesis that non-
linearities do not exist in conditional means of exchange rates can be easily
rejected in a robust fashion.  However, these non-linearities arise in a model
which is usually rejected on other statistical criteria.  In any case, the
economic meaning of these terms is far from clear.  The signs of the
coefficients do not correspond to target-zone non-linearities.  The fact that
these non-linear terms are often significant during regimes of floating rates
seems to bolster the notion that the non-linear terms do not represent target-
zone effects.  To study this issue further, we now turn to a forecasting
methodology.
VIII: Forecasting with Linear and Non-Linear Models
In this section of the paper we compare the forecasting ability of
linear exchange rate models with models which have additional non-linear terms
implied by the target zone literature.  We find that the presence of
additional non-linear terms does not produce better "ex-post" forecasts than
those of linear models.  This result, combined with the in-sample analysis of
the previous section mirrors the results of Diebold and Nason (1990). 
Our baseline forecasting experiment proceeds as follows.  Consider a
given country (say Belgium) and a given EMS regime (say the period before the
first realignment, from March 1979 through September 1979).  Using the first
thirty observations, we estimate the drift term for fundamentals by regressing
the first-difference of exchange rate fundamentals on a constant.  This
provides us with estimates of ó2 and ç.  Given these estimates and our choice
of á, we can solve for ë1 and ë2; hence we can generate the two non-linear
terms, exp(ë1ft) and exp(ë2ft).  We then run two regressions: 1) (the linear
model) et = ð0+ð1ft+v
L
t; and 2) (the non-linear model) et =28
ö0+ö1ft+ö2exp(ë1ft)+ö3exp(ë2ft)+v
NL
t.  We then generate forecast errors by
substituting in the actual future values of the regressors to generate a
forecast; thus, the one-step non-linear forecast error is given by u
NL
t / et+1 -
[0+1ft+1+2exp(ë1ft+1)+3exp(ë2ft+1)].  We then add an observation to the initial set
of (30) observations and repeat the procedure until we arrive at the week
before the next EMS realignment. 
The square roots of the mean squared forecast errors (RMSEs) from linear
and non-linear models (computed with á=.1) are tabulated in table 5 below. 
The results are also presented in a graphical format in figure 27 which
portrays the ratio of the linear to non-linear RMSE for the six different
countries and thirteen different EMS regimes.  There is little evidence that
non-linear models provide superior forecasts.  In particular, the ratios of
linear to non-linear RMSEs are typically around one; there is no evidence that
they tend to increase over time (as might be expected with increasing
credibility), or that they tend to be larger for countries with credible
reputations like the Netherlands. 
We have checked the sensitivity of these results extensively.  Figures
28 and 29 and A14 through A16 are comparisons of a number of different
perturbations of linear and non-linear forecast errors.  Figure 28 presents
ratios of linear to non-linear mean absolute errors (MAEs); figure 29 uses
á=1.  Rolling regression techniques are used to produce figure A14, while
figure A15 imposes ð1=ö1=1.
46  Finally figure A16 compares RMSEs for 20-step
ahead forecasts.  The finding that linear models seem to forecast EMS exchange




Economists often judge the value of a model by its predictive abilities.
 It is well known that sophisticated exchange rate models which appear to be
satisfactory on the basis of in-sample criteria, often do not forecast out-of-
sample data better than extremely naive alternatives.
50  In this section, we
have shown that non-linear models do not forecast better than simpler, linear,
models; this finding appears to be robust.
IX: Other Implications of Target Zone Models
Thus far, the empirical work that we have pursued has depended on our
measure of exchange rate fundamentals.  If this measure is flawed (e.g.,
because a risk premium drives a wedge between the interest differential and
expected depreciation, or because the flexible-price model is inapplicable),
our empirical work will also be faulty.  For this reason, we now turn to tests
of target zones which do not depend on fundamentals.
Target zone models have a variety of implications which can be examined
without a measured exchange rate fundamental (Bertola and Caballero (1990b),
Svensson (1990a,b,c,d) and Smith and Spencer (1990)).  For instance, as noted
in section II, the interest differential in a credible target zone is expected
to be declining in the deviation of the exchange rate from its central parity;
the exchange rate should spend most of its time near the boundaries; and
exchange rate volatility should be greatest in the middle of the band.  In
this section, we examine some of these other aspects of the data.30
Exchange Rate Volatility by Band Position
Figures 27 through 32 are scatter-plots of the absolute value of the
daily change in the exchange rate against the deviation of the exchange rate
from its central parity (in percentage points).  The upper and lower exchange
rate bands are marked by vertical lines (at +/- 2.25%); a non-parametric
smoother is also provided.  The graphs are intended to convey a sense of the
relationship between the volatility of the exchange rate and its position
inside the band.  It is not easy to find a clear pattern in the smoothers,
either by country or by EMS regime (credible or not).  The relationship is
occasionally U-shaped (as suggested by Bertola and Caballero (1990b), but the
smoother is just as likely to have an inverted U-shape.  Monotonic or flat
smoothers are also apparent throughout the figures. 
The evidence from other regimes of fixed exchange rates is similar to
that of the EMS.  Figures A17 and A18 are scatter-plots of absolute values of
exchange rate first-differences against deviations of the exchange rate from
central parity for the Bretton Woods and gold standard regimes respectively. 
There does not appear to be a consistent pattern to the relationship. 
Interest Rate Differentials by Band Position
Figures 36 through 41 provide comparable scatter-plots of 2-day interest
rate differentials against the deviation of the exchange rate from its central
parity.  As noted in section II, models of credible target zones imply that
the interest rate differential should be declining against the deviation of
the exchange rate in a non-linear fashion; the model of Bertola and Caballero
(1990b) implies the opposite.  However, there are again no clear patterns in
the data.
51  The Bretton Woods and gold standard analogues to the interest
rate differential: exchange rate position graphs are in figures A19 and A20. 
While the relationship appears to be slightly negative for the gold standard,
the Bretton Woods data seem difficult to characterize.31
Exchange Rate Distributions by Band Position
Figures 42 through 47 provide histograms of exchange rates.  The results
are quite confusing.  We find weak evidence of bi-modality in the exchange
rate distribution for Belgium, Denmark and France.  On the other hand, uni-
modality appears to be the norm for the Dutch and Italian rates.  Despite the
widespread perception of increasing EMS credibility, we also see no clear
indications of a change in the pattern of the histograms over time.
Figures A21 and A22 are the Bretton Woods and gold standard analogues to
figures 42-47.  Again, the data do not seem particularly close to the patterns
predicted by existing exchange rate theories. 
Svensson's "Simplest Test"
Another (non-statistical) "test" of target zone credibility has been
proposed by Svensson (1990b).  Svensson uses uncovered interest parity (which
should hold closely in a credible target zone as shown in Svensson (1990a)) to
derive expected future exchange rates.
52  Svensson's test is simply to graph
the time-series of expected future exchange rates and see whether they lie
within the exchange rate bands. 
Figures A23 through A28 provide time-series plots of the actual exchange
rate, et, and the exchange rates expected as of time t to prevail 2 days, 30
days and one year in the future.  Exchange rate bands are also presented.  The
data indicate that the exchange rate expected to prevail in the near term (two
days and thirty days in the future) is typically within the exchange rate
bands.  But with the exception of the Dutch exchange rate, exchange rates
expected to prevail in a year are often outside the bands for prolonged
periods of time, even for more recent data.
53  This is a further inconsistency
between the predictions of credible target zone models and the EMS data.32
Summary
Target zone models have a number of implications which can be
empirically examined without relying on a measure of exchange rate
fundamentals.  In this section, we examined: interest rate differentials;
exchange rate volatility; exchange rate distributions; and implied expected
future exchange rates.  These auxiliary (albeit informal) tests provide no
support for models of credible target zones, and only weak support for models
with realignments such as Bertola and Caballero (1990b).
X: Summary and Conclusion
Using uncovered interest parity in a framework which implicitly depends
on a flexible-price exchange rate model, we derived a measure of exchange rate
fundamentals.  With the aid of this measure of fundamentals, we tested target
zone models of exchange rate behavior in a number of ways.  Graphical
examination of the relationship between exchange rate levels and fundamentals
did not yield strong evidence of economically meaningful and important non-
linearities, certainly not those implied by existing target zone models. 
Explicit in-sample parametric tests of the non-linear terms implied by target
zone models yield the conclusion that non-linearities are usually
statistically significant; however, a number of aspects of these models work
poorly in-sample, on both economic and statistical grounds.  More importantly,
linear models forecast out-of-sample data just as well as models with
additional non-linear terms.  Finally, a number of additional implications of
target zone models which do not depend on our measure of fundamentals, have
been tested and found not to be in accord with the data.  For instance, there
does not appear to be any particular relationship between exchange rate and
interest rate volatility, and expected future exchange rates often fall
outside the EMS bands.  Moreover few of the relationships between the exchange
rate and a) interest rate differentials, b) exchange rate volatility, and c)
exchange rate distributions seem to be in accord with existing theories.33
We conclude that at an empirical level, there is little advantage
apparent in working with non-linear rather than linear models of exchange rate
conditional means.  This result is exactly analogous to the conclusions of
Meese and Rose (1990a) for flexible exchange rate regimes.  Our results also
imply that there is little empirical support for existing target zone models
of exchange rates.34
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1: Alpha Estimates
Regime Belgium Denmark France Ireland Italy Neth.
1 -.01  .02 -.15   n/a   .00   .03
(.02) (.06) (.16)      (.01) (.03)
2  .12  .17 -.11   n/a -.02   .03
(.05) (.15) (.09)       (.002) (.06)
3  .05 -.02  .23   n/a -.003   .11
(.05) (.06) (.18)       (.004) (.05)
4  .12 -.02 -.04   n/a  .004 -.09
(.02) (.04) (.003)      (.002) (.06)
5  .21  .05  .03 n/a -.03   .01
(.13) (.25) (.03)      (.02) (.11)
6 -.23  .83  .02  .10  .01  .01 
(.16) (.79) (.01) (.09) (.01) (.02)
7  .02  .18 -.003  .08   .004   .01
(.09) (.08) (.0004) (.05) (.001) (.03)
8  .03  .01  .22  .04 -.05   .00
(.05) (.04) (.14) (.04) (.03) (.06)
9  .02  .18  .01  .01 -.01 -.12
(.06) (.15) (.02) (.07) (.07)  (.20)
10 -.17 -.68  .06  .09  .02    -.02
(.09) (.44) (.11) (.07) (.01)  (.10)
11  .21  .31  .32  .04 -.02       .17
(.31) (.27) (.12) (.02) (.02)     (.22)
12 -.01 -.30  .07 -.02   .02       .04
(.25) (.30) (.28) (.09) (.03)     (.05)
13  .03  .04  .05  .10 -.01      -.10
(.22) (.33) (.19) (.06)   (.04)     (.05)
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Results are static regressions of change
in log of bilateral (vs DM) exchange rate on constant and change in 2-day
interest differential (except where only 30-day rates are available).  IV
regressions (instruments are constant and five lags of interest
differentials).  Newey-West covariance estimators (usually using 11 lags).37
2: Test of Restriction Alpha=.1
Regime Belgium    Denmark     France   Ireland Italy  Neth.
1 .00** .15 .12 n/a .00**       .03*
2 .72 n/a .02* n/a .00** .23
3 .29 .05* .48 n/a .00** .91
4 .22 .00** .00** n/a .00**       .00**
5 .41 .84 .02 n/a .00** .42
6 .04* .35 .00** .97 .00**       .00**
7 .36 .34 .00** .68 .00**       .01**
8 .13 .04* .40 .13 .00** .13
9 .18 .57 .00** .18 .13 .28
10 .00** .08 .72 .84 .00** .24
11 .72 .43 .07 .01* .00** .73
12 .68 .19 .93 .19 .01 .23
13 .75 .87 .78 .99 .01**    .00**
Marginal significance levels are tabulated; for convenience, test statistics
which are significant at the .05 (.01) level are marked with one (two)
asterisk(s).  Tests are computed from static regressions of change in log of
bilateral (vs DM) exchange rate on constant and change in 2-day interest
differential (except where only 30-day rates are available).  IV regressions
(instruments are constant and five lags of interest differentials).  Newey-
West covariance estimators.38
3: Estimates of e:f Slope, á=.1
Regime Belgium Denmark France Ireland Italy Neth.
1 1.02 1.08** 1.13**  n/a   .86* 1.03*
(.09) (.03) (.04)      (.06) (.02)
2  .88**  .97  .84**  n/a  .86** 1.01
(.03) (.07) (.02)       (.10) (.05)
3  .89 1.04 1.02   n/a  .87  1.05
(.07) (.13) (.06)       (.07) (.05)
4  .57**  .70**  .50*   n/a  .06**  .80**
(.06) (.08) (.20)      (.09) (.07)
5 1.02 1.00  .98 n/a  .92  1.08
(.03) (.05) (.02)      (.14) (.07)
6 1.10*  .96  .24**  .99  .79   .85
(.04) (.19) (.19) (.03) (.18) (.09)
7 1.04*  .97  .01** 1.02   .43   .97
(.02) (.11) (.09) (.02) (.31) (.02)
8  .97  .96  .93**  .90**  .98** 1.02
(.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.004) (.01)
9 1.06**  .95**  .92** 1.17** 1.15**  .95*
(.02) (.01) (.03) (.04) (.03)  (.02)
10  .87** 1.03  .97**  .93**  .23**   .74**
(.04) (.02) (.004) (.02) (.14)  (.03)
11  .96  .87  .93 1.21**  .72**     .97
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04)     (.03)
12  .88**  .89**  .95**  .73** 1.00       .90**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.06) (.01)     (.03)
13 1.00 1.05** 1.05**  .90** 1.13**     1.01
(.01) (.02) (.02) (.01)   (.04)     (.04)
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Results are static regressions of log of
bilateral (vs DM) exchange rate on constant and fundamentals (2-day rate used
except where only 30-day rates are available).  Newey-West covariance
estimators (usually using 6 lags).  Coefficients which are significantly
different from unity at the .05 (.01) level are marked with one (two)
asterisk(s).39
4: Hypothesis Tests for Non-Linear Terms, á=.1
Joint Hypothesis Tests for Non-Linear Terms
Regime    Belgium     Denmark     France      Ireland Italy  Neth.
1 .00 .02 .00 n/a .22 .00
2 .00 .49 .00 n/a .00 .00
3 .11 .00 .14 n/a .18 .00
4 .00 .00 .00 n/a .00 .03
5 .08 .00 .15 n/a .00 .00
6 .00 .00 .00 .00 .27 .00
7 .00 .91 .00 .00 .00 .16
8 .20 .00 .00 .00 .00 .50
9 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02
10 .00 .13 .00 .00 .00 .00
11 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .90
12 .00 .00 .03 .00 .82 .00
13 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .44
Entries are marginal significance level for joint test È1=È2=0 in regression
et-ft-áv = È1exp(ë1ft)+È2exp(ë2ft)+È3ft+wt.  Throughout, á=.1; ó2 and ç (and
therefore ë1 and ë2) are country- and regime-specific.  Newey-West covariance
estimators are used, with six lags.
Signs of È1 and È2
Regime    Belgium     Denmark     France      Ireland Italy  Neth.
1 ++ ++ -- n/a -- -+
2 -- -- -- n/a -- -+
3 ++ ++ ++ n/a -- -+
4 ++ -- -- n/a -- -+
5 ++ -- -- n/a ++ -+
6 ++ ++ -- ++ -- -+
7 -- -- -+ -- -- -+
8 -- -- -- -- ++ --
9 -- -- ++ -- -- -+
10 -- ++ -- -- -- ++
11 ++ ++ -- ++ -- --
12 ++ ++ -+ -- ++ ++
13 ++ ++ -- ++ -- ++40
Q-tests for residual serial correlation
Regime    Belgium     Denmark     France      Ireland Italy  Neth.
1 .00 .00 .00 n/a .00 .00
2 .47 .01 .51 n/a .99 .07
3 .00 .00 .00 n/a .00 .00
4 .00 .00 .00 n/a .00 .00
5 .00 .00 .22 n/a .00 .00
6 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00
7 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
8 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
9 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
10 .00 .00 .06 .00 .00 .00
11 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00
12 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
13 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Entries are marginal significance levels for serial correlation of wt from
regression et-ft-áç = È1exp(ë1ft)+È2exp(ë2ft)+È3ft+wt, á=.1.
T-Tests of È3=0
Regime    Belgium     Denmark     France      Ireland Italy  Neth.
1 .00 .75 .58 n/a .21 .25
2 .14 .28 .45 n/a .54 .09
3 .44 .00 .06 n/a .13 .00
4 .10 .01 .00 n/a .00 .60
5 .08 .00 .08 n/a .00 .00
6 .20 .01 .09 .00 .12 .00
7 .00 .93 .08 .00 .00 .06
8 .71 .00 .00 .01 .03 .53
9 .17 .86 .72 .00 .90 .95
10 .00 .87 .01 .00 .00 .27
11 .00 .00 .83 .93 .06 .99
12 .24 .03 .96 .00 .66 .00
13 .00 .01 .61 .66 .45 .22
Entries are marginal significance level of t-statistics of hypothesis È0=0 in
regression et-ft-áç = È1exp(ë1ft)+È2exp(ë2ft)+È3ft+wt, á=.1  Throughout, á=.1; ó2
and ç (and therefore ë1 and ë2) are country- and regime-specific.  Newey-West
covariance estimators are used, with six lags.41
5: RMSE from One-Step Ahead "Ex-Post" Forecast Experiments (á=.1): Baseline
Case
Regime     Denmark   Ireland      Belgium     France       Neth.      Italy
1 Linear 109 79 64 248
1 Non-Lin  119 92 67 244
2 Linear 48 21 97 280
2 Non-Lin  46 21 102 338
3 Linear 148 98 131 473
3 Non-Lin  180 99 149 492
4 Linear 117 477 103 599
4 Non-Lin  110 337 112 518
5 Linear 105 37 56 157
5 Non-Lin  104 40 56 157
6 Linear 143 125 46 356 91 170
6 Non-Lin  144 107 51 541 109 266
7 Linear 381 132 74 864 64 1615
7 Non-Lin  402 119 81 719 68 815
8 Linear 170 110 109 64 51 74
8 Non-Lin  162 103 112 50 52 86
9 Linear 46 131 48 115 24 150
9 Non-Lin  48 110 45 116 24 152
10 Linear 39 91 77 18 30 75
10 Non-Lin 49 83 63 15 30 68
11 Linear 50 102 43 62 28 57
11 Non-Lin 37 114 515 66 29 73
12 Linear 98 150 45 60 54 121
12 Non-Lin 102 116 45 64 53 124
13 Linear 39 53 25 30 21 130
13 Non-Lin 38 55 25 31 21 133
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 100,000Endnotes
1.  A simple flexible-price monetary model consists in: a domestic money
demand equation (m-p=öy-ái+å); the definition of the real exchange rate
(q=e+p*-p); and uncovered interest parity (i-i*=E(de/dt)); where m is the log
of the money supply, p denotes the log of the price level, y denotes the log
of real income, i denotes the nominal interest rate, å is a shock to the
domestic money demand equation, q denotes the real exchange rate, and an
asterisk denotes foreign variables.  Elimination of endogenous prices and
interest rates leads to (1), where the fundamental are defined as ft=mt+vt
(where v denotes velocity, given by vt=-öyt+qt-p*t-åt).  See e.g., Froot and
Obstfeld (1989a) or Svensson (1990c).  A risk premium can be added to the
uncovered interest parity equation; this is discussed further below.  In
future work, we plan to extend our analysis to models with sticky prices.
2.  The particular solution is f + áç, while the solution of the homogenous
part is A1exp(ë1f) + A2exp(ë2f).
3.  Froot and Obstfeld (1989b) provide a discussion of bubbles in the context
of the stock market; see also Flood and Hodrick (1989).
4.  This condition is used in Krugman (1990), Froot and Obstfeld (1989a), and
Svensson (1990c).  To prove this proposition, write down the smooth pasting
conditions, assuming that the first holds for the identically-signed
constants.  Note that it is then impossible for the second to hold under those
conditions.  Also note that the constant attached to the exponential term with
the positive root must be negative so that the solution line will turn down
for high values of f.
5.  Bertola and Caballero (1990b) discuss comparable distributional properties
for a model which incorporates realignments.
6.  In a cross section, if á is constant across countries and regimes, this
becomes an equation for estimating á.  This method has the advantage of being
not being dependent on measured fundamentals.  Actual results are discussed
below.
7.  We are unable to use survey data on exchange rate expectations, since this
is neither collected at a fine frequency, nor is it collected on bilateral
European rates.
8.  Hodrick (1987) provides further analysis.
9.  The risk premium in two day contracts would be due to two day conditional
covariance between U'(Ct+h)/Pt+h and ERt+h where h is two days.  The conditional
covariance between two variables is the expected product of surprises in the
two magnitudes.  We find it hard to believe that consumption and pricing plans
can be expected to change much over the course of two days to match exchange
rate surprises over the same two days.  In our view, both prices and
consumption are sticky compared with the exchange rate, at least at the 2-day
horizon.  Therefore, while both the risk premium and the expected rate of
change of the exchange rate go to zero over short horizons we think that the
consumption-based risk premium would go to zero faster than would the expected
rate of change of the exchange rate.  Over longer contract periods, such as a
month, we are much less complacent about assuming away risk premia. 10.  Our assumption does not necessarily allow one to deduce that the implied
two day forward rate, (1+it+h)Et/Ft+h where h = two days, would be an unbiased
predictor of Et+h in any particular sample since that sample may contain a
small number of important but irregularly realized events, such as shifts in
the exchange rate zone boundaries.  In fact, standard tests of unbiasedness on
our EMS data reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness.  This is a standard
finding (Hodrick (1987), Froot and Thaler (1990)).
11.  The approximations are: ln(1+i) - ln(1+i*) . i - i* and ln(ERt+h,t/ERt) .
(et+h,t-et).  The second approximation is much the more worrisome of the two
since the logarithm is a nonlinear operator, which induces Jensen's Inequality
problems.  Since we are using only two day forecasts, our error of
approximation may be small.  Give an algebraic example.
12.  We refer to the UK as a "non-EMS" country, although the UK is actually an
EMS member which does not participate in the ERM.
13.  The rates are averages across several Euro-markets.
14.  Belgium has a system of dual exchange markets.  We use the official rate,
which is used for current account transactions.  The Belgian central bank is
committed to following EMS rules for the official market; the financial rate
floats freely.  We have also checked our key results with financial rate data,
and our conclusions are not affected.
15.  We treat each daily observation identically, and take no special account
of e.g., day-of-the-week or holiday effects.  By ignoring any "time
deformation", we are implicitly assuming that economic time effectively stops
on holidays and weekends.  As much of our analysis does not depend on the
time-series properties of the data, we are not excessively worried about this
assumption.  Further, the hypothesis that day-of-the-week dummies do not enter
significantly into regressions of exchange rate levels and interest rate
differentials on a constant, cannot generally be rejected at conventional
significance levels.  In some of our parametric work below, we have also
separated out Friday data from other data; our results are never substantially
affected by this division.
16.  The typical two-day settlement period in foreign exchange markets
reflects the fact that the ultimate transfer of funds must take place in the
domestic payments systems in countries whose currencies are involved in the
transaction.  For example, let bank A in London buy deutsche marks (DM) with
U.S. dollars from bank B.  To deliver DM, bank B would instruct its
correspondent bank in Frankfurt to transfer DM from its account to bank A's
correspondent bank in Frankfurt.  At the same time, bank A would use the SWIFT
(Society for World Wide Interbank Financial Transactions) system to instruct
its U.S. correspondent bank to transfer dollars to bank B's correspondent U.S.
bank.  Bank A's U.S. correspondent bank would then debit bank A's account and
transfers funds through the clearinghouse of international payments (CHIPS),
which are credited the same day in the CHIPS accounts to bank B's U.S.
correspondent bank.  The next day the net balances on CHIPS between the two
U.S. correspondent banks would be settled through the "Fed wire."  Bank B's
U.S. correspondent bank would then notify bank B through SWIFT that the funds
had been received.
17.  Most Euro-currency deposits carry a fixed maturity.  Normally, the
deposits will be effective two business days after the contract is in effect
and mature, for example, 180 days later.  However, deposits can be madeeffective immediately (today or day one) or on the following day (day two). 
The short-term end of the Euro-currency deposit market consists of the
following types of deposits:
Type of Deposit              Length of Deposit            Days Effective
Overnight                         1 day                 From day 1 to day 2
Tomorrow/next                     1 day                 From day 2 to day 3
Spot/next                         1 day                 From day 3 to day 4
Spot/week                         7 days                From day 3 to day 10
Spot/fortnight                   14 days                From day 3 to day 17
18.  Political risk reflect the possibility that the bank which issues the
Euro-currency deposit may suddenly be confronted by the government of the
country in which it is physically located with new restrictions or taxes on
the transfer of funds once the deposit matures.  As France and Italy have
maintained capital controls throughout this period, political risk
considerations are important in any study of the EMS.  While the extent of the
political risk premia might vary with the maturity of the deposit, it should
be relatively uniform across different currencies of denomination.  Thus the
differentials between Euro-currency interest rates on deposits denominated in
different currencies should be relatively free of political risk premia. 
Sampling across several Euro-markets should also help to alleviate this
problem.  If such capital controls were relatively unchanged during a
particular period, they could introduce a wedge between the yields on
instruments demonstrated in different currencies, even in the Euro-currency
markets, as well as between domestic and offshore instruments denominated in
the same currency.  However, this wedge may vary over time because capital
controls have been progressively eased for countries such as France and Italy.
 Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) provide further discussion
Euro-currency interest rates also reflect credit risk considerations,
since the depositor is essentially extending credit to the banks, which could
fail before the deposit matures.  To the degree that it is more difficult to
forecast the creditworthiness of the banks over a longer rather than shorter
time horizon, any credit risk premium would rise with the maturity of the
deposit, and be small for our 2-day interest rates.  Moreover, since the
bank's failure would affect all its contractual obligations, the credit risk
would be reflected in the deposit interest rates in all currencies, and would
not be likely to affect interest rate differentials.
Settlement failure is also a risk, either when the deposit is created or
when it matures.  A settlement failure when the deposit is established would
leave the bank without an expected amount of funding and would force it to
rapidly search for substitute funding.  A settlement failure once the deposit
matures can leave the depositors short of funds.  With regard to a bank
defaulting on its obligations to repay, credit risk can be viewed as
reflecting the likelihood that the bank will fail prior to the maturity of the
deposit; whereas settlement risk would reflect the bank's failure after the
deposit matures but before the transfer of funds occurs.  Once again, however,
this settlement risk should be fairly uniform across currencies, and would
therefore not affect interest rate differentials across currencies. 
A liquidity premium could also be reflected in Euro-currency deposit
rates, reflecting such factors as the fact that the bank obtains a more
certain cost of funding with longer maturity deposits.  Such liquidity premia
would vary with the maturity of the deposits; they could also differ across
currencies, at a given maturity, if liquidity in one market (e.g., the U.S.
dollar) was better than that for another currency.  This raises the issue of
whether variation in these liquidity premia might not disguise an otherwise
stable empirical relationship between expected exchange rate movements andinterest rate differentials.  In most cases, changes in relative liquidity
premia would not distort the normal relationship between interest rate
differentials and exchange rate movements.  For example, a tightening of
domestic monetary conditions could lead to higher liquidity premia in a given
country.  As that country's banks sought additional liquidity from external
sources, the domestic exchange rate would be expected to appreciate.  The
normal relationship might not exist during a liquidity crises, when domestic
financial instability might lead to both increased domestic liquidity premia
and an expected depreciation of the domestic currency.  However, since our
sample consists primarily of industrial countries with stable financial
systems it is unlikely that financial crises have distorted our empirical
relationship.
19.  In particular, we checked for outliers from both levels and log-
differences of the series by computing descriptive statistics and carefully
examining the data graphically.  Some 150 apparent outliers were then compared
with independent quotations from The Financial Times.  We have also checked
our data against internal IMF data, and provided our data corrections to Hali
Edison and Graciela Kaminsky, who are performing independent research with the
same data.  Our programs, data and documentation are available upon receipt of
three boxes of formatted high-density 3.5" diskettes.  Most of the computing
was performed in RATS 3.0, Micro-TSP 6.5, STATA 2.0, and Lotus 1-2-3 2.01;
documents are word-processed in Word-Perfect 5.1.  This offer expires one year
after publication.
20.  Thus a typical American interest rate might be ln(1+(8/100))..08.
21.  Our presentation has been greatly influenced by Tufte's (1983) superb
monograph.  Thus we typically present groups of data with greater than twenty
observations in graphical format, and we repeatedly use small multiples
graphs.
22.  Government authorities may also defend implicit target zones which change
over time and differ from declared target zones; splitting the sample may
alleviate this problem.
23.  This hypothesis can be confirmed in a more rigorous fashion through
regression techniques, pooling data across EMS regimes and countries.  The
estimated standard deviation of the exchange rate is essentially uncorrelated
with the estimated standard deviation of the interest rate differential; this
result is also robust to inclusion of year or country fixed effects.  There is
also little evidence of any non-linearity in this relationship, although
Svensson (1990c) derives a non-linear relationship between the width of a
target zone and unconditional interest rate variability.
24.  Svensson ((1990c) asserts that there should be a tradeoff between the
conditional variances of interest rates and the width of the fundamentals
band.  Conditional variances of the log of the exchange rate and the 2-day
interest differential are tabulated below.  Indeed, the slope of the
stderr(e):stderr(i-i*) relationship should provide an estimate of -á. 
However, regression techniques which pool data across regimes and countries,
lead to a positive relationship between conditional interest rate differential
volatility and exchange rate volatility; this result is insensitive to
inclusion of regime-specific effects.  If the data are first-differenced
(taking into account any country-specific "fixed effect"), this effect is
wiped out.
The data below are standard errors of the residual from a linearregression of the variable on a constant and five lags of exchange rates and
interest differentials.
Descriptive Statistics on Conditional Volatility during the EMS
1: Standard Error of Residual for Log Exchange Rate
Start Date Belgium Denmark France Ireland Italy  Neth.
13-3-79 .0266 .0148 .0445 .0100
24-9-79 .0359 .0235 .0716 .0140
29-11-79 .0633 .0349 .1067 .0246
22-3-81 .0944 .0576 .1637 .0401
4-10-81 .0806 .0467 .1332 .0331
21-2-82 .0587 .0374 .0374 .0096 .1080 .0247
12-6-82 .0830 .0557 .0517 .0125 .1447 .0341
21-3-83 .1180 .0766 .0745 .0208 .1946 .0511
21-7-85 .1213 .0756 .0770 .0189 .2024 .0487
6-4-86 .0611 .0335 .0385 .0082 .1017 .0238
3-8-86 .0720 .0418 .0380 .0077 .1144 .0247
12-1-87 .0575 .0348 .0332 .0069 .1007 .0210
5-1-90 .0406 .0243 .0234 .0048 .0756 .0147
2: Standard Error of Residual for 2-day Interest Rate Differential
(German-Foreign Rate)
Start Date Belgium Denmark France Ireland Italy  Neth.
13-3-79 .0057 .0047 .0225 .0045
24-9-79 .0065 .0049 .0220 .0059
29-11-79 .0084 .0037 .0439 .0072
22-3-81 .0093 .0469 .1039 .0047
4-10-81 .0074 .0038 .0122 .0042
21-2-82 .0022 .0053 .0487 .0055 .0387 .0163
12-6-82 .0039 .0112 .0846 .0065 .1386 .0044
21-3-83 .0039 .0073 .0017 .0038 .0043 .0020
21-7-85 .0030 .0017 .0081 .0060 .0053 .0014
6-4-86 .0024 .0018 .0013 .0045 .0140 .0023
3-8-86 .0015 .0017 .0030 .0068 .0097 .0016
12-1-87 .0014 .0020 .0016 .0030 .0064 .0030
5-1-90 .0018 .0024 .0021 .0030 .0064 .0023
25.  Judged by conventional Box-Ljung Q-statistics, the residuals from a
regression of the first-difference of fundamentals on a constant look like
white-noise for most EMS regimes and countries, while the intercepts are
usually close to zero both statistically and economically.  However, even in
this linear framework, there are some clear violations; lagged first-
differences of fundamentals sometimes have explanatory power for first-
differenced fundamentals, and some constants are significant.  Of course, in a
target zone set-up, reflection terms (at the bands) should also contribute
explanatory power.
26.  As sample size varies by regime, the two standard error bands correspond
to intervals of varying confidence levels.
27.  We have also tried to estimate á with a technique which relies on
McCallum's substitution of actual exchange rate changes in place of
anticipated movements; this technique typically delivers estimates of á near -
1.  As discussed above, we have also tried to estimate á by regressing regime-
sepcific conditional volatilities of exchange rates on conditional
volatilities of interest rate differentials; this result typcially delivers an
estimate of á near zero.  The latter technique could be extended within
regimes by employing an ARCH-like specification for conditional volatilities
(this would deliver more observations for estimation purposes).  One could
also measure f by regressing (i-i*) on e and defining the residual plus the
constant to be f.  This approach has the advantage of not depending on
additional assumptions about f; it is potentially important with data sampled
less finely than is our data, since the target zone reflections of
fundamentals can bias coefficient estimates for the f process.28.   The average number Goldfeld reports is -.004, but he chose interest rate
units so that 10 percent per year, for example, was entered as 10. We choose
units so that 10 percent per year is entered as .10. Under our convention,
Goldfeld's estimates need to be multiplied by 100.
The estimates Goldfeld reports are the product of a speed of adjustment,
which has units percent per quarter, and the semi-elasticity of money demand,
having time units which are the inverse of the time units of the interest or
expected rates of change of asset prices. Throughout this study we will use
annualized interest rates so our interest rate semi-elasticities have units
years.
29.  The estimates Goldfeld and Sichel report involve the following countries
and data periods; Canada 1962:1 - 1985:4, Japan 1966:1-1985:4, France 1964:1-
1985-4, Germany 1969:1-1985:4, Italy 1971:1-1985:4, U.K. 1958:1-1986:1. The
results for these countries match quite closely with the results for the U.S.
in terms of the magnitude of the short-run interest rate semi-elasticity.
30.  We temporally average fundamentals (instead of selectively sampling
fundamentals), to correspond to the way that industrial production is
measured.
31.  Quarterly in the cases of Belgium and France.
32.  The smoother divides the horizontal axis into a number of bands (we
generally use five), and calculates the cross-median of e and f within each
band.  The cross-medians are then connected with cubic splines.  Meese and
Rose (1990b) use a different non-parametric smoothing technique (locally-
weighted regression) and arrive at results consistent with ours.  See also
Diebold and Nason (1990) and Meese and Rose (1990a).
33.  Adjacent values are defined as 150% of the interquartile range rolled
back to the nearest data point.
34.  On the other hand, the problem is explicitly a small sample problem.  In
a credible target zone, the exchange rate should spend most of its time near
the bands, as noted by Bertola and Caballero (1990b), and Svensson (1990c).
35.  The analysis of Bertola and Caballero (1990a,b) implies that the shape of
the non-linearities should be changing over time from an inverted S-shape to
Krugman's S-shape.
36.  This is true so long as the implicit bands are constant (as the declared
bands are).  Hali Edison and Graciela Kaminsky are currently testing the
hypothesis of constant implicit bands.
37.  We plan to resolve this issue in future work (with Lars Svensson) with
data on actual intervention.
38.  Thus far, in all of our empirical work we have used Germany as the
domestic country.  Figures A8-A13 in the appendix show scatters comparable to
figures 11-16 but using Italy (by most criteria, one of the most historically
volatile members of the EMS) as the base country instead of Germany.  A wide
range of non-linearities are manifest in the smoothers.  However, few of these
seem consistent with the implications of target zone models.39.  Swiss 2-day interest rate data appear to be unreliable; hence we use 30-
day rates.  It is rumored that the Swiss defend an implicit peg of the Franc
against the DM.
40.  Using a higher value of á (say 1) changes the Bretton Woods graphs
considerably; the smoothers do not tend to be positively sloped, and are
extremely wiggly.  Below, we show that much higher values of alpha (e.g., 1.)
appear unreasonable in a number of different dimensions.  Higher alpha values
(say .5) for the gold standard data do not greatly change the graphs.
41.  The smoother shapes are vaguely reminiscent of Krugman's S-shape for
parts of the lower tails; however, upper tails appear to be essentially
linear.
42.  This may be, in part, the result of movement in the gold points.  These
are the exchange rates at which arbitrage gains from physical transportation
of gold exceed transportation costs; the gold points were market forces which
limited fluctuations in exchange rates during the gold standard.  Myers
(1931), Officer (1986), and Spiller and Woods (1988) provide further analysis.
 Movements in the gold points are conceptually similar to movements in
implicit EMS exchange rate bands (when the authorities defend bands which
differ from declared bands); however, the smoother patterns are very
different.
43.  Simultaneous estimation is complicated by two facts: 1) the well-known
leptokurtosis in exchange rates is manifest in gross violations of normality
of the shocks to the fundamentals equation (12); and 2) choice, rather than
estimation, of á precludes serious statistical work, unless one is willing to
guess the covariances of á with other parameters.
44.  If the non-linear terms represent "intrinsic non-linear bubbles", È1 and
È2 are well-behaved with the additional assumptions of normality of wt and
independence of zt.  Froot and Obstfeld (1989b) provide further analysis.
45.  Imposing È3=0 strengthens this negative result further; the different
coefficient signs for the Dutch data disappear.
46.  The only difference between rolling regressions and our standard
methodology is that the rolling regression method entails adding an
observation to the end of the sample while simultaneously deleting another
from the beginning of the sample.  Thus thirty observations are always used to
estimate the ð and ö coefficients.
47.  Unsurprisingly, an (ex ante) random walk model of the exchange rate
produces forecasts of future exchange rates which are usually worse than those
of either our ex-post linear or non-linear models.  This is also true of the
forward rate.
48.  Linear and non-linear models produce approximately equal RMSEs for the
Bretton Woods data.  For the gold-standard data, non-linear models produce
RMSEs which are around 20% smaller than linear models.
49.  One can rigorously test the hypothesis of equality of forecast error

















t) is iid N(0,W), a test of the null hypothesis w11=w22 can be49
computed from t(T-2)=ø(T-2)
.5/(1-ø2)
.5 where T is the number of errors and ø is
the estimated sample correlation between v1 and v2.  Under the null
hypothesis, this test statistics is distributed as Student's t with T-2
degrees of freedom.  Such standard tests often do not reject the null
hypothesis of equal variances.  There are also many rejections, as might be
expected from the RMSE bar-charts. 
50.  Meese and Rogoff (1983) showed that linear structural exchange rate
models do not forecast better than a random walk; Diebold and Nason (1990) and
Meese and Rose (1990a) extend this finding to non-parametric techniques.
51.  Svensson (1990d) also derives implications for the entire term structure
of interest rate differentials for a credible target zone.  When we use 2-day,
30-day interest rate data, we find no clear pattern of differences between the
slopes of various maturities of interest rate differential/exchange rate
position smoothers.
52.  Algebraically, uncovered interest parity implies tet+k =
et[(1+it)/(1=it*)]
(ô/360) where: tet+k is the exchange rate which is expected at
time t to prevail at time t+k; and it (it*) is the return on a domestic
(foreign) bond with ô days to maturity.  This assumes that there is no risk
premium at any time horizon.
53.  While a "peso problem" could be important in the earlier EMS regimes, we
are skeptical about its importance for the data since 1987.A1
Appendix: The European Monetary System
This appendix provides a brief summary of the European Monetary
System.  More extensive treatment of the subject is available in Folkerts-
Landau and Mathieson (1989) and Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989).
The European Monetary System was created by the European Community
to create "a zone of monetary stability" through monetary cooperation and
managed exchange rates.  The EMS currently consists in a set of rules which
constitute the exchange rate mechanism (the ERM), as well as credit
arrangements and the establishment of the European Currency Unit (ECU)
currency basket.
We focus on the period from the establishment of the EMS on March
13, 1979 through May 1990.  Eight countries participated in the ERM during
this period: Belgium-Luxembourg; Denmark; France; Germany; Ireland; Italy; and
the Netherlands.  The UK and Greece do not currently participate in the ERM. 
Spain entered the ERM in 1989.
The ERM is a regime of fixed but adjustable exchange rates.  Each
participant has a central ECU parity; this establishes a grid of bilateral
central parities.  The margins of fluctuation are set for most countries at
plus/minus 2.25% (until 1990 Italy chose a wider margin of 6%); at these
margins, participant central banks are obliged to intervene to defend the band
in unlimited amounts.
During the eleven years that we focus on, there have been twelve
realignments of the EMS.  The dates and events are tabulated below.A2
EMS Realignments
Consistent with the notation of the paper, a revaluation of 3% is denoted by
"-3".
Regime  Date Belgium Denmark France Germany Ireland Italy Neth
1 13-3-79 EMS Begins
2 24-9-79 +3 -2
3 29-11-79 +4.74
4 22-3-81 +6
5 4-10-81 +3 -5.5 +3 -5.5
6 21-2-82 +8.5
7 12-6-82 +5.75 -4.25 +2.75 -4.25
8 21-3-83 -1.5 -2.5 +2.5 -5.5 +3.5 +2.5 -3.5
9 21-7-85 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 +6 -2
10 6-4-86 -1 -1 +3 -3 -3
11 3-8-86 +8
12 12-1-87 -2 -3 -3
13 5-1-90 +3.7A3
A1: Descriptive Statistics on Volatility during the EMS
1: Standard Error of Log Exchange Rate
Start DateBelgium Denmark France Ireland Italy Neth.
13-3-79 54 149 55 66 44 71
24-9-79 30 68 14 40 49 28
29-11-79 67 73 60 84 107 71
22-3-81 26 34 64 25 54 21
4-10-81 83 74 46 44 35 31
21-2-82 68 49 57 67 88 48
12-6-82 117 90 81 151 143 58
21-3-83 79 94 82 101 221 37
21-7-85 55 82 36 112 71 19
6-4-86 37 52 50 74 8 12
3-8-86 35 25 29 56 26 13
12-1-87 46 11 85 41 141 22
5-1-90 50 62 51 50 51 11
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 10,000 for ease of presentation.
2: Standard Error of 2-day Interest Rate Differential (German-Foreign Rate)
Start Date Belgium Denmark France Ireland Italy Neth.
13-3-79 180 n/a 105 n/a 228 70
24-9-79 66 n/a 45            n/a 193 69
29-11-79 236 n/a 130           n/a 489 164
22-3-81 213 n/a 635           n/a 1110 111
4-10-81 99 n/a 40            n/a 171 72
21-2-82 131 230 837 95 447 194
12-6-82 96 490 2331 143 1548 70
21-3-83 126 204 101 149 93 54
21-7-85 60 65 108 219 199 25
6-4-86 82 52 23 94 188 50
3-8-86 40 55 55 159 121 32
12-1-87 79 170 95 247 123 67
5-1-90 23 55 43 69 132 24
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 10,000.
3: Standard Error of Fundamentals (2-day interest rates, á=.1)
Start Date Belgium Denmark France Ireland Italy Neth.
13-3-79 50 n/a 48 n/a 44 69
24-9-79 33 n/a 16 n/a 54 28
29-11-79 71 n/a 57 n/a 111 66
22-3-81 38 n/a 78 n/a 103 23
4-10-81 81 n/a 47 n/a 33 28
21-2-82 61 45 83 67 100 52
12-6-82 113 79 226 147 159 59
21-3-83 81 94 88 112 225 36
21-7-85 52 87 38 95  60 20
6-4-86 43 50 51 79 18 15
3-8-86 37 29 30 45 35 13
12-1-87 52 12 89 48 140 24
5-1-90 50 59 48 55 44 11
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 10,000.A4
A2: Perron-Phillips Unit-Root Tests
Country   Belgium     Denmark      France     Netherlands   Italy     Ireland
1 e -.01 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.02 -.00
f -.01 -.00 -.00 -.02
   (i-i*) -.00  n/a -.00 -.00 -.04  n/a
2 e -.01 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.06 -.00
f -.01 -.00 -.00 -.05
   (i-i*) -.00  n/a -.00 -.00 -.01  n/a
3 e -.25 -.08 -.03 -.00 -1.76 -.04
f -.25 -.03 -.00 -1.29
   (i-i*) -.01  n/a -.00 -.01 -.40  n/a
4 e -.09 -.02 -.01 -.00 -.57 -.03
f -.10 -.01 -.00 -.57
   (i-i*) -.01  n/a -.16 -.00 -.74  n/a
5 e -.03 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.10 -.00
f -.03 -.00 -.00 -.10
   (i-i*) -.00  n/a -.00 -.00 -.01  n/a
6 e -.02 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.06 -.00
f -.02 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.06 -.00
   (i-i*) -.00 -.00 -.13 -.00 -.08 -.00
7 e -.07 -.01 -.01 -.00 -.22 -.01
f -.06 -.01 -.02  .00 -.21 -.01
   (i-i*) -.00 -.01 -.33 -.00 -1.53 -.00
8 e -.21 -.05 -.02 -.00 -1.04 -.03
f -.21 -.05 -.02 -.00 -1.04 -.03
   (i-i*) -.01 -.02 -.00 -.00 -.01 -.01
9 e -.05 -.01 -.01 -.00 -.26 -.01
f -.05 -.01 -.01 -.00 -.26 -.01
   (i-i*) -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00
10 e -.04 -.01 -.01 -.00 -.14 -.00
f -.04 -.01 -.01 -.00 -.14 -.00
   (i-i*) -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.01 -.00
11 e -.07 -.01 -.01 -.00 -.33 -.01
f -.07 -.01 -.01 -.00 -.33 -.01
   (i-i*) -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.01 -.00
12 e -1.55 -.36 -.32 -.01 -7.51** -.17
f -1.55 -.35 -.32 -.01 -7.52** -.17
   (i-i*) -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.02 -.01
13 e -.12 -.03 -.03 -.00 -.54 -.01
f -.12 -.03 -.03 -.00 -.54 -.01
   (i-i*) -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00
Perron-Phillips tests with constant (but not deterministic trend) included; l=5 lags
included in construction of STl with Newey-West weights.  Test statistics which are
significant at the .01 level are marked with two asterisks.A5
A3: Hypothesis Tests for Non-Linear Terms, á=1
Regime    Belgium     Denmark     France      Ireland     Italy     Neth.
1 .00 .00 .00 n/a .00 .00
2 .00 .00 .00 n/a .00 .00
3 .00 .00 .00 n/a .00 .00
4 .00 .00 .00 n/a .00 .00
5 .00 .00 .00 n/a .00 .00
6 .05 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
7 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
8 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
9 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
11 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
12 .00 .00 .00 .00 .80 .00
13 .17 .09 .17 .00 .00 .00
Entries are marginal significance level for joint test È1=È2=0 in regression et-ft-áç
= È1exp(ë1ft)+È2exp(ë2ft)+È3ft+wt.  Throughout, á=1.; ó2 and ç (and therefore ë1 and ë2)
are country- and regime-specific.  Newey-West covariance estimators are used, with
six lags.  Note: no entries for regime 10.
Signs of È1 and È2
Regime    Belgium     Denmark     France      Ireland     Italy     Neth.
1 -- -- ++ n/a -- ++
2 ++ ++ -- n/a -- --
3 -- -- -- n/a -- --
4 -+ -- ++ n/a -- ++
5 -- -- -- n/a -- --
6 -- ++ ++ ++ -- ++
7 -- ++ -+ ++ ++ ++
8 ++ ++ ++ -- -+ ++
9 ++ -- -- -- -- ++
11 ++ ++ -- -- -- ++
12 ++ ++ ++ -- -- ++
13 -- -- -- -- -- --A6
A4: Hypothesis Tests for Non-Linear Terms, á=.1, First-Differenced Version
Regime    Belgium     Denmark     France      Ireland     Italy     Neth.
1 .00 .00 .01 n/a .00 .00
2 .00 .82 .00 n/a .00 .00
3 .00 .00 .07 n/a .00 .00
4 .01 .36 .00 n/a .00 .00
5 n/a .32 .00 n/a .00 .00
6 .33 .00 .00 .15 .00 .00
7 .03 .04 .00 .00 .00 .01
8 .00 .09 .32 .01 .00 .00
9 .01 .07 .00 .02 .01 .10
11 .00 .00 .18 .15 .00 .06
12 .18 .02 .00 .00 .00 .02
13 .24 .00 .00 .35 .00 .01
Entries are marginal significance level for joint test È1=È2=0 in regression Ä(et-ft-
áç) = È1Äexp(ë1ft)+È2Äexp(ë2ft)+È3Äft+w't.  Throughout, á=.1; ó2 and ç (and therefore
ë1 and ë2) are country- and regime-specific.  Newey-West covariance estimators are
used, with six lags.  Note: no entries for regime 10.
Signs of È1 and È2
Regime    Belgium     Denmark     France      Ireland     Italy     Neth.
1 ++ ++ -+ n/a ++ --
2 -- ++ -- n/a ++ ++
3 ++ ++ ++ n/a -- ++
4 ++ -- -- n/a -+ --
5 ++ ++ -- n/a ++ --
6 ++ ++ -- ++ -- ++
7 ++ ++ -- ++ -- ++
8 ++ -- ++ -- -- --
9 ++ -- ++ -- ++ ++
11 ++ ++ ++ ++ -- ++
12 ++ ++ ++ -- -- ++
13 ++ -- ++ ++ -- --A7
A5: Estimates of e:f Slope, á=.05
Regime Belgium Denmark France Ireland Italy Neth.
1 1.04 1.05** 1.07**  n/a  1.00  1.02*
(.04) (.02) (.02)      (.02) (.01)
2  .94** 1.00  .93**  n/a  .96** 1.02
(.01) (.03) (.01)       (.01) (.02)
3  .97 1.08 1.02   n/a  .98  1.04
(.04) (.06) (.03)       (.02) (.02)
4  .79**  .87**  .88    n/a  .47**  .95  
(.05) (.05) (.13)      (.08) (.04)
5 1.01 1.01  .99 n/a 1.03  1.05
(.01) (.02) (.01)      (.05) (.03)
6 1.05** 1.04  .73   1.00  .93   .96
(.02) (.09) (.27) (.01) (.08) (.03)
7 1.02* 1.07  .24** 1.01   .93   .99
(.01) (.06) (.27) (.01) (.11) (.01)
8  .99  .99  .97**  .95**  .99** 1.02*
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.002) (.01)
9 1.03**  .97**  .98   1.08** 1.09**  .98 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02)  (.01)
10  .94** 1.02  .98**  .96**  .54*   .87**
(.02) (.02) (.002) (.01) (.18)  (.02)
11  .98  .94**  .97 1.11**  .85**     1.00
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.03)     (.02)
12  .94**  .95**  .98**  .92** 1.00       .97*
(.01) (.004) (.003) (.03) (.004)     (.01)
13 1.00 1.03** 1.02**  .95** 1.08**     1.02
(.001) (.01) (.01) (.01)   (.01)     (.01)
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Results are static regressions of log of
bilateral (vs DM) exchange rate on constant and fundamentals (2-day rate used except
where only 30-day rates are available).  Newey-West covariance estimators (usually
using 6 lags).  Coefficients which are significantly different from unity at the .05
(.01) level are marked with one (two) asterisk(s).A8
A6: Estimates of e:f Slope, á=1.
Regime Belgium Denmark France Ireland Italy Neth.
1 -.03** -.03** -.17**  n/a  -.01**  .50**
(.07) (.11) (.18)      (.02) (.17)
2  .26**  .16**  .15**  n/a  .07**  .06**
(.05) (.05) (.03)       (.03) (.08)
3  .07** -.08**  .07**  n/a  .01**  .01**
(.05) (.06) (.10)       (.03) (.08)
4  .05**  .07** -.02**  n/a -.02**  .02**
(.02) (.02) (.02)      (.01) (.03)
5  .38**  .24**  .57** n/a -.03** -.05**
(.13) (.07) (.10)      (.03) (.13)
6 -.07** -.04** -.02**  .31**  .04**  .06**
(.12) (.08) (.02) (.18) (.02) (.07)
7  .69* -.07** -.01**  .54** -.03**  .41**
(.14) (.03) (.001) (.12) (.003) (.09)
8  .29**  .16**  .43**  .30**  .78**  .25**
(.05) (.06) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.10)
9  .39**  .57**  .10** -.36** -.16**  .39**
(.13) (.03) (.08) (.15) (.04)  (.07)
10  .27**  .50  .71**  .42**  .00**   .14**
(.09) (.29) (.04) (.11) (.01)  (.02)
11  .47**  .28**  .26** -.24**  .14**      .09**
(.15) (.05) (.11) (.08) (.03)     (.05)
12  .35**  .38**  .46**  .03**  .57**     .12**
(.02) (.02) (.04) (.02) (.08)     (.03)
13  .85  .71    .73    .41** -.14**      .04**
(.12) (.23) (.20) (.04)   (.08)     (.04)
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Results are static regressions of log of
bilateral (vs DM) exchange rate on constant and fundamentals (2-day rate used except
where only 30-day rates are available).  Newey-West covariance estimators (usually
using 6 lags).  Coefficients which are significantly different from unity at the .05
(.01) level are marked with one (two) asterisk(s).A9
A7: Mean Absolute Error from Baseline Forecast Experiments
Regime     Denmark   Ireland      Belgium     France       Neth.      Italy
1 Linear 176 73 54 167
1 Non-L  151 76 51 160
2 Linear 49 16 84 211
2 Non-L  49 17 81 178
3 Linear 199 104 145 260
3 Non-L  189 98 135 285
4 Linear 97 446 99 357
4 Non-L  100 419 102 290
5 Linear 88 29 71 169
5 Non-L  86 25 59 163
6 Linear 324 91 149 294 178 109
6 Non-L  267 73 152 420 149 174
7 Linear 384 120 80 281 45 329
7 Non-L  389 90 60 249 44 266
8 Linear 170 96 107 65 39 64
8 Non-L  146 82 103 57 38 66
9 Linear 34 138 45 46 19 146
9 Non-L  35 105 45 47 19 135
10 Linear 41 78 66 15 25 61
10 Non-L 43 64 50 14 25 55
11 Linear 38 135 29 43 29 54
11 Non-L 30 134 83 48 30 50
12 Linear 85 192 42 70 42 89
12 Non-L 78 181 41 69 42 89
13 Linear 39 41 23 35 29 98
13 Non-L 38 44 23 36 28 103
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 100,000A10
A8: Mean Error from Baseline Forecast Experiments
Regime     Denmark   Ireland      Belgium     France       Neth.      Italy
1 Linear -172 -55 -35 36
1 Non-L  -126 -41 -23 21
2 Linear -27 6 -52 -201
2 Non-L  -32 6 -49 -96
3 Linear 179 91 143 -154
3 Non-L  155 84 105 -50
4 Linear 68 -444 -72 -230
4 Non-L  73 -419 -63 -141
5 Linear -46 -23 60 -129
5 Non-L  -39 -9 47 -122
6 Linear -313 20 -149 -287 -165 -60
6 Non-L  -267 7 -152 28 -135 70
7 Linear -378 -82 -61 -264 34 -212
7 Non-L  -365 -10 -19 -50 18 -104
8 Linear -124 -38 -67 52 -17 49
8 Non-L  -88 6 -61 -51 -18 -23
9 Linear 19 -110 -31 -6 7 -122
9 Non-L  15 -75 -36 -5 7 -122
10 Linear -40 -2 -2 3 3 -27
10 Non-L -31 2 11 9 5 -23
11 Linear -10 -122 20 -20 -22 -31
11 Non-L -3 -111 -54 -22 -20 19
12 Linear 98 164 24 61 34 34
12 Non-L 37 179 26 58 31 30
13 Linear 30 -9 11 27 27 56
13 Non-L 28 13 14 27 27 53
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 100,000A11
A9: RMSE from One-Step Ahead "Ex-Post" Forecast Experiments (á=.1): Rolling
Regressions
Regime     Denmark   Ireland      Belgium     France       Neth.      Italy
1 Linear 85 82 68 260
1 Non-L  96 94 80 236
2 Linear 50 26 96 285
2 Non-L  48 27 105 335
3 Linear 115 59 119 327
3 Non-L  124 64 137 347
4 Linear 93 434 95 531
4 Non-L  98 388 103 443
5 Linear 112 40 46 186
5 Non-L  106 43 47 192
6 Linear 87 111 72 166 120 240
6 Non-L  85 104 66 264 106 292
7 Linear 334 94 70 384 68 1908
7 Non-L  335 92 68 6489 64 623
8 Linear 96 51 55 27 36 63
8 Non-L  97 53 52 30 37 65
9 Linear 38 100 44 92 23 85
9 Non-L  41 128 43 139 25 96
10 Linear 43 65 44 15 31 68
10 Non-L 49 78 35 17 31 69
11 Linear 39 105 36 66 29 62
11 Non-L 38 107 515 92 28 59
12 Linear 45 53 24 34 39 91
12 Non-L 49 55 27 36 62 112
13 Linear 34 50 25 31 22 133
13 Non-L 36 55 29 48 23 121
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 100,000A12
A10: RMSE from One-Step Ahead "Ex-Post" Forecast Experiments (á=.1): No estimation
for fundamental term
Regime     Denmark   Ireland      Belgium     France       Neth.      Italy
1 Linear 141 78 69 250
1 Non-L  119 92 69 244
2 Linear 55 18 93 336
2 Non-L  46 21 102 338
3 Linear 209 92 110 505
3 Non-L  180 99 149 492
4 Linear 147 595 98 1185
4 Non-L  110 337 112 518
5 Linear 105 38 41 167
5 Non-L  104 40 56 157
6 Linear 105 108 49 663 114 200
6 Non-L  144 107 51 541 109 266
7 Linear 433 147 100 1098 67 1530
7 Non-L  402 119 81 719 68 815
8 Linear 214 128 130 55 49 82
8 Non-L  162 103 112 50 52 86
9 Linear 52 208 55 120 23 169
9 Non-L  48 110 45 116 24 152
10 Linear 30 47 26 16 45 93
10 Non-L 49 83 63 15 30 68
11 Linear 59 106 37 64 27 76
11 Non-L 37 114 515 66 29 73
12 Linear 110 98 45 74 51 124
12 Non-L 102 116 45 64 53 124
13 Linear 47 55 25 32 22 116
13 Non-L 38 55 25 31 21 133
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 100,000A13
A11: RMSE from One-Step Ahead "Ex-Post" Forecast Experiments (á=1.)
Regime     Denmark   Ireland      Belgium     France       Neth.      Italy
1 Linear 320 265 378 477
1 Non-L  446 272 374 548
2 Linear 101 90 306 619
2 Non-L  94 83 322 269
3 Linear 579 487 596 802
3 Non-L  551 458 538 935
4 Linear 228 785 235 553
4 Non-L  229 370 218 736
5 Linear 542 178 290 275
5 Non-L  552 217 325 269
6 Linear 424 419 335 473 217 250
6 Non-L  356 443 426 592 284 322
7 Linear 709 870 563 740 423 1240
7 Non-L  724 930 571 3328 397 4589
8 Linear 825 491 617 392 297 731
8 Non-L  789 423 621 289 299 699
9 Linear 317 791 390 397 140 525
9 Non-L  343 763 381 583 134 687
10 Linear 278 328 251 142 80 85
10 Non-L 289 357 185 96 83 88
11 Linear 232 515 336 270 99 127
11 Non-L 232 658 771 433 106 151
12 Linear 526 409 232 502 210 1009
12 Non-L 496 396 220 480 212 1032
13 Linear 405 241 170 228 63 189
13 Non-L 399 186 134 220 64 374
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 100,000A14
A12: RMSE from One-Step Ahead "Ex-Post" Forecast Experiments (á=.1) vs Random Walk
Regime     Denmark   Ireland      Belgium     France       Neth.      Italy
1 RW   115 11 99 126
1 Non-L 119 92 67 244
2 RW   134 114 183 215
2 Non-L 46 21 102 338
3 RW   165 176 183 179
3 Non-L 180 99 149 492
4 RW   198 339 173 154
4 Non-L 110 337 112 518
5 RW 459 156 161 120
5 Non-L 104 40 56 157
6 RW   301 172 142 150 110 138
6 Non-L 144 107 51 541 109 266
7 RW   290 189 200 257 150 187
7 Non-L 402 119 81 719 68 815
8 RW   238 185 119 130 128 169
8 Non-L   162 103 112 50 52 86
9 RW   198 197 158 156 127 115
9 Non-L  48 110 45 116 24 152
10 RW 220 224 86 101 93 72
10 Non-L 49 83 63 15 30 68
11 RW 158 149 351 177 155 124
11 Non-L 37 114 515 66 29 73
12 RW 191 136 132 163 131 185
12 Non-L 102 116 45 64 53 124
13 RW 188 258 120 131 72 155
13 Non-L 38 55 25 31 21 133
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 100,000A15
A13: RMSE from Two-Step Ahead Linear and Non-Linear "Ex-Post" Forecast Experiments
(á=.1) vs Implied Forward Rate
Regime     Denmark   Ireland      Belgium     France       Neth.      Italy
1 Linear 118 88 69 265
1 Non-L 152 122 79 262
1 Forward 153 135 131 164
3 Linear 143 70 119 500
2 Non-L 159 72 152 479
3 Forward 212 216 220 226
4 Linear 104 543 87 197
4 Non-L 107 321 94 245
4 Forward 278 457 207 230
5 Linear 112 43 73 205
5 Non-L 123 47 75 205
5 Forward 681 191 217 144
7 Linear 396 147 70 456 70 497
7 Non-L 453 123 82 575 75 506
7 Forward 353 215 281 348 202 315
8 Linear 169 103 103 63 50 76
8 Non-L 167 104 108 50 50 91
8 Forward 267 211 146 151 140 238
9 Linear 48 132 50 91 22 123
9 Non-L 51 111 48 92 23 121
9 Forward 221 215 184 182 143 154
11 Linear 31 113 19 69 25 60
11 Non-L 30 126 19 73 27 59
11 Forward 186 173 133 196 143 162
12 Linear 95 129 45 61 54 122
12 Non-L 101 118 44 65 54 127
12 Forward 219 151 145 196 137 244
13 Linear 31 60 32 36 23 156
13 Non-L 35 75 34 39 23 182
13 Forward 232 268 151 156 80 199
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 100,000A16
A14: RMSE from Twenty-Step Ahead "Ex-Post" Forecast Experiments (á=.1)
Regime     Denmark   Ireland      Belgium     France       Neth.       Italy
1 Linear  81 94 67 286
1 Non-L            295 192 76 282
3 Linear         161 103 162 524
3 Non-L          242 112 241 552
4 Linear         137 622 86 301
4 Non-L         126 415 98 302
7 Linear   453 204 64 455 73 514
7 Non-L     518 223 142 514 114 514
8 Linear   206 172 127 70 60 108
8 Non-L    199 206 123 83 56 327
9 Linear 58 202 64 96 26 172
9 Non-L  93 162 66 97 27 169
11 Linear 35 73 28 33 30 70
11 Non-L 36 78 34 49 32 55
12 Linear 108 159 57 71 58 139
12 Non-L 136 127 61 104 60 244
All raw numbers have been multiplied by 100,000Order of the Figures:
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